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ABSTRACT 
INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: 
THE CASE OF FOR/NON PROFIT MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS 
SEPTEMBER, 1987 
DANA ANTHONY FORGIONE, B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
M.S.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Ronald C. Mannino 
This study provides improvements upon prior comparative 
research in assessing the association of real valued hospital 
financial and operating performance variables with 
for-profit/non-profit incentive structures, both within the 
population of multihospital systems and across system/ 
independent hospitals. 
A national sample of data under the first year of the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System was used, along with a 
concurrent measure of Medicare case mix. Multivariate Factor 
Analysis was used to analyze the correlation structure of the 
variables and provided a 70% reduction in the data set. 
Twelve major factors of variation were extracted, accounting 
for 75.3% of the data variance. Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis was used to assess the marginal relative 
discriminatory power of both the factors and highest loading 
raw data variables. 
vi 
Hospital service production, service volume, and 
multihospital system size and organizational related factors 
were found to be significantly associated with managerial 
incentive groups. The results have implications for 
assessment by policy makers of the relative merits of for/non 
profit incentive structures, by providing direction in the 
identification of managerial decision variables upon which 
benchmark standards may be established. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
This study provides improvements upon prior research in 
assessing the association of real valued hospital financial 
and operating performance variables with for-profit/ 
non-profit (FP/NP) incentive structures, both within the 
population of multihospital systems, and across 
system/independent hospitals. 
A national sample of data under the first year of the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) was used, along 
with a concurrent measure of Medicare case mix. Quality of 
care was controlled using Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Hospitals (JCHA) status as a structural proxy, along with 
measures of physician hours per case, malpractice costs, and 
the relative proportion of interns and residents costs to 
physician hours. Multivariate factor analysis was employed 
to analyze the correlation structure of the variables, and to 
provide for reduction of the data to an independent set of 
twelve major and eighteen minor underlying performance 
factors. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) was used to 
assess the marginal discriminatory power of the performance 
factors (as well as the highest loading raw data variables) 
relative to nine variations of FP/NP organizational types. 
Fundamental variables were used due to the lack of market 
value of equity for NPs and lack of market value of debt for 
1 
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individual system members. Controls for intervening 
alternative economic factors were also included (see Figure 
1) . 
The results will have implications for assessment by 
policy makers of the relative merits of the FP/NP incentive 
structures by identifying managerial decision variables which 
were significant discriminators between FP/NP 
hospital types. As Neumann [30] suggests, such decision 
variables can serve as useful public policy tools in guiding 
the identification of performance dimensions upon which 
benchmark standards may be established. Relative to such 
standards, reimbursement programs may be adjusted to reward 
individual hospital progress toward meeting the standards. 
Service production, service volume, and multihospital 
system size and organization related factors were found to be 
the most distinguishing characteristics of the nine incentive 
groups. 
Importance to Public Health Care Economic Policy 
Throughout the past decade, the number of hospitals 
joining FP multihospital systems has grown dramatically. 
Watt et al. [41] state that while the total number of 
hospitals in the United States has not changed over the past 
ten years, the proportion of hospitals affiliated with FP 
systems has increased by 80%. At the same time, the number 
of independent FP hospitals has decreased by an equivalent 
3 
proportion. In 1979 the total number of both FP and NP 
system affiliated hospitals constituted 26% of all community 
hospitals in the United States (Renn et al. [33]). In 1984, 
approximately 58% of the 2,050 American Hospital Association 
(AHA) registered multihospital system affiliates were NP and 
42% were FP hospitals (AHA [1]). The average number of beds 
in FP system hospitals is about one half that of their NP 
counterparts, indicating that FP systems control over 20% of 
system affiliated beds (AHA [1]). 
White [42] has aptly noted that 
Meanwhile the growth of certificate-of-need 
regulation, designed to limit new investments in 
hospital facilities, has forced policy-makers to 
make choices between permitting for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals to expand. As a result, there 
has been a good deal of debate over the relative 
merits of the two types of hospitals. 
Indeed, there has been a proliferation of opinion and 
theoretical argument in the current literature over relative 
merit issues. Critics of FP hospitals assert that the 
profits are earned through "cream skimming" of the most 
lucrative patient cases (see White [42]) and demographic 
locations (see Coyne [17]). Rafferty and Schweitzer [32] 
attempted to demonstrate that skimming existed to a far 
greater extent than prior research had been able to 
document. Arguments about lower quality of care in FPs have 
been raised (White [42]), but quality is very difficult to 
measure (Donabedian [20]); and no conclusive evidence on any 
4 
quality differences has emerged. Sherman [37] concludes that 
unless better measures of quality are developed, there is no 
basis for further investigation of the quality issue. 
On the other hand, proponents of FP systems assert that 
centralized management, purchase discounts, and economies of 
scale constitute efficiencies that FPs are able to achieve in 
the delivery of health care (see Watt et al. [41]). These 
efficiencies, however, are also available to NP system 
hospitals. Nonetheless, it is widely documented that FP 
revenues are higher than the NPs, and Pattison and Katz [31] 
interpret the evidence in their study as indicating 
aggressive "loss leader" pricing strategies on the part of FP 
hospitals, to which those authors attribute the FP 
profitability. 
The issue that seems most clearly important is that the 
profit incentive may have significant implications for a 
redistribution of the availability of quality health care, as 
well as for the economic performance of hospitals. Research 
to date on the comparative performance of FP/NP hospitals, 
however, has been fragmented and has produced mixed and 
inconclusive results. Multihospital systems were chosen as a 
primary interest in the proposed study, in addition to 
independent hospitals, since Coyne [14] has demonstrated that 
systems realize cost and productivity levels different from 
independent hospitals. Given the rapid expansion of FP 
multihospital systems in recent years, systems offer 
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opportunities for demonstration of performance effects of the 
profit incentive, relative to NP counterparts of similar 
(i.e., chain) organizational structures. 
The primary contribution of this study is improvement 
upon prior research through providing greater statistical and 
experimental control in the assessment of performance 
differences between FP/NP hospitals. Improved controls 
contribute to providing results that are of greater 
reliability, and hence, of improved usefulness to policy 
makers1 decisions regarding adjustment of reimbursement 
programs (such as Medicare, Medicaid, or similar 
programs)—the objectives of which programs may include 
rewarding economic performance, consistent with social 
requirements for the long run availability and quality of 
health care. 
The next chapter of this dissertation discusses 
significant prior research relevant to this subject. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Comparative Hospital Performance 
Research on the comparative performance of differing 
hospital organization types has improved in rigor and 
consistency over time, but continues to suffer from several 
important limitations. This chapter provides a review of the 
most immediately relevant literature. The review covers 
direct empirical studies of comparative hospital performance, 
as well as related theoretic and methodological issues. 
The primary limitations apparent in the literature are: 
1. Lack of adequate statistical controls for 
intercorrelated variables. 
2. Lack of consistent experimental controls for 
case mix, quality, location, etc. 
A variety of comparative studies have been done which 
reveal conflicting and inconclusive evidence regarding the 
relative performance of FP/NP hospitals. For example, Berry 
[9] found that FPs had higher cost/day, while Feldstein and 
Schuttinga [22] found in their Massachusetts hospital study 
that 40% of average NP cost/day was due to case mix 
differences. Subsequently, Bays [7] found that FPs were 
significantly less costly after case mix adjustments, which 
was, however, consistent with what Berry [9] had found after 
taking the shorter length of stay (LOS) in FPs into account. 
That is, cost/day is higher in FPs, but due to their shorter 
6 
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LOS, cost/case is lower, relative to NPs. Alternatively, the 
more recent Renn et al. [33] study found no differences in 
patient care expenses, tio LOS differences, and no consistent 
case mix differences. 
In contrast, there is considerable unanimity in the 
literature concerning the finding of higher revenues in FPs 
compared to NPs. The difference has been primarily 
attributed to higher FP charges for ancillary services (Lewin 
et al. [28]). Pattison and Katz [31] reported that in 
California, FPs earned higher profits on ancillary services 
than NPs, but lost more on routine daily services — indicating 
a "loss leader" pricing strategy. Pattison and Katz [31] did 
not perform any tests of statistical significance, however, 
and did not directly control for case mix or quality 
differences among their sample hospitals. 
The charge of "cream skimming" has frequently been 
leveled at the FPs and several studies have been done 
comparing FP/NP case mix variables. As mentioned above, Renn 
et al. [33] found no case mix differences between the two 
types of hospitals. Rafferty and Schweitzer [32] 
demonstrated that studies with matched-pairs designs will 
understate comparative differences if the matching variables 
(typically including number of beds) are closely associated 
with the comparison variables. They demonstrated that range 
of services (i.e., case mix capacity) is highly correlated 
with the number of beds. Becker and Steinwald [8] used a 
Commission on Professional Hospital Activities (CPHA) 
Resource Need Index (RNI) as a measure of case mix (i.e., 
case mix provided) in a study of hospital variables related 
8 
to case mix. Their data demonstrate a monotonic increase in 
RNI with the number of beds and with the degree of teaching 
commitment—thus supporting an association of case mix with 
number of beds as well. 
Range of services was found to be more highly associated 
with costs than case mix by Berry [9]. Watt et al. [40] used 
a matched-pairs design and found no case mix differences 
between FP chain and NP independent hospitals. The matching 
variables, however, included average LOS, average daily 
census, and services offered. It is plausible, therefore, 
based on Rafferty and Schweitzer’s [32] analysis that the 
Watt et al. [40] finding of no case mix differences is 
understated due to correlation of the comparison variables 
with the matching variables—notably, services offered. The 
similar Renn et al. [33] finding of no case mix differences, 
however, was not based on a matched-pairs design. The 
seeming mutual support between the Renn et al. [33] and Watt 
et al. [39] studies, however, is confounded by the Watt et 
al. [41] comparison of FP system to NP independent 
hospitals. That is, the ownership-related differences may be 
affected by intervening system/independent effects as well. 
Bays [6] found that FPs tend to specialize in the less 
complex patient cases. He noted significant differences in 
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diagnostic type for 37% of all case categories studied, with 
FPs admitting fewer older patients than NPs. Bays [7] noted 
significant differences in some case categories for 
independent FPs and independent NPs, but no differences when 
comparing system FPs to independent NPs (consistent with the 
Watt et al. [41] finding). He states that additional 
research on system FPs is clearly warranted. 
Coyne [14] studied system vs. independent hospitals 
directly, using LOS as a proxy for case mix. (Note that Watt 
et al. [41] used LOS as a matching variable in studying case 
mix comparisons, while Coyne [14] used LOS as a proxy for 
case mix—thus supporting the Rafferty and Schweitzer 
correlated variables issue.) He found that system hospitals 
had higher costs and productivity than independent hospitals 
and that size (number of facilities in system) is 
significantly correlated with system age. He notes also that 
interrelationships among the indicators have not been 
attended to in prior research. 
The issue of case mix differences and the attendant 
effects on measurement of hospital performance variables is 
still unresolved. Sherman [37] stresses that comparison of 
one hospital to another offers no conclusive evidence 
regarding performance differences if the hospitals are 
providing very different patient treatments or are operating 
with different service output volumes. Accordingly, case mix 
and patient volume proxies were incorporated into this 
10 
research s tudy. 
In spite of the evidence regarding the intercorrelated 
nature of important hospital characteristic and performance 
variables, the majority of studies have relied on univariate 
statistics, or models requiring the assumption of 
orthogonality in the data. Although Berry [9] used factor 
analysis in constructing service mix measures, he used 
regression and t tests in his comparative analysis. Bays [6] 
used one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression. 
Elnicki [21] used a log linear, one period lag, 
autoregressive (pooled cross sectional and time series) 
regression model. Although he found that multicollinearity 
was not a problem in his data set, he did find that size 
(number of beds) was significantly negatively related to 
working capital per day, and that the ownership results were 
too mixed to draw conclusions. More recently, the univariate 
t test approach was used in Watt et al. [41] and both t tests 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression were used in Renn 
et al. [33]. Pattison and Katz [31] used no statistical 
tests at all, and Coyne [14] used stepwise regression and 
correlation analysis. The most notable use of more 
appropriate multivariate statistics is Neumann [30]. He used 
principal components analysis to reduce the data set of 
hospital performance variables, then used the component 
scores as input into an MDA model to distinguish between 
groups of hospitals. His methodology, however, involved an a 
11 
priori, intuitive separation of his ninety-two performance 
measures into six groups. Each group was then subjected to 
principal components analysis, producing one or two 
components each. The prior grouping seems both unnecessary 
and a source of potential bias. The potential correlation 
structure across the prior intuitive groupings is not taken 
into account in constructing the components; thus a different 
set of principal components and loadings might have been 
derived, had the prior grouping been done differently, or not 
done at all. Whether this would have significantly affected 
Neumann's [30] results is indeterminate. Nonetheless, 
principal components is not a scale-free method, and 
Neumann's [30] analysis involved only NP hospitals and did 
not control for case mix (only service mix). Extension and 
improvement upon his work was therefore considered a fruitful 
research direction for this study. 
The highly intercorrelated nature of financial 
performance variables is also well documented. Altman et al. 
[4] have prepared an extensive review of the relevant 
literature on multivariate classification analysis using 
financial variables. The models and findings reviewed in 
their work form a well-supported background for improving 
research design in the study of comparative hospital 
financial performance. 
There is just about unanimous agreement in the literature 
regarding FP hospitals* selectivity of locations. Coyne 
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[17], in his study of mu 11i-institutiona1 organizations 
(MIOs) by ownership type, notes his own prior work with 
Young, which documents an FP tendency to locate in the more 
prosperous, high-growth areas. He further stresses a new 
importance attributable to facility location, as hospitals 
enter an era of FP/NP joint ventures in facility 
construction. Coyne [17] further cites work by Ermann and 
Gabel, demonstrating primary FP location throughout the 
Sunbelt states, whereas NPs tended to be more regional in 
distribution. Lewin et al. [28] studied hospitals in 
California, Florida, and Texas. All major systems were 
represented. The States chosen had little hospital 
regulation of rates or entry, which they indicate makes these 
states very attractive to FP hospitals. Berry [9] notes 
regional cost differences, and Pattison and Katz [31] note 
that location and selection of medical staff are probably 
more important determinants of patient mix than ownership. 
It could be asserted, however, based on Coyne’s [17] 
discussion, that location is probably also a function of 
ownership. Feldstein and Shuttinga [22] found that when ten 
surgical case mix factors were included with medical case 
mix, size (number of beds), duration, and Boston location, in 
a cost regression, the Boston location was significant. 
Graef [23] argues for the necessity of controlling for 
hospital domain (which includes the population served) in his 
methodological critique. Becker and Steinwald [8] found that 
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although the urban/rural distinction was insignificant in 
their case mix regression, a simple correlation did exist. 
Anderson and Steinberg [5] found that the urban/rural 
distinction was a significant predictor of readmission 
rates — a proxy for the qua 1ity of care. Accordingly, 
hospital location and system dispersion identifiers were 
included in this study. Furthermore, the observation that 
FPs operate on average with approximately one half the number 
of beds of NP hospitals (see AHA [1]) correlates with the FP 
tendency to locate in the more prosperous, high growth, 
Sunbelt regions (Coyne [17], Lewin et al. [28]) to suggest a 
cost/volume/profit (CVP) related operating strategy. That 
is, FPs may be pursuing a combined strategy of low overhead 
and high volume service output. If such is the case, the 
expectation would be that the relative proportion of fixed 
costs to total costs would be lower, and turnover rates would 
be higher in FP hospitals. Although data on fixed costs are 
not available in the data sources, proxies such as number of 
beds and total fixed assets were incorporated into the 
analysis. A number of different turnover measures were 
derived from the data and were included as well. 
The issue of quality comparison among hospitals Is also 
Important to research design. Donabedian [20] defines 
quality of care as structural, process, and outcome related. 
Most studies which have attempted to control for quality 
differences have relied upon structural proxies. Berry [9] 
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used accreditation as a (structural) quality measure. Bays 
[6,7] used case mix adjusted death rates (an outcome 
measure). Neumann [30] grouped NP hospitals by services 
(structural) using Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) 
analysis, and assumed quality to be constant within each 
group. Pattison and Katz [31] used California Health 
Facility Commission peer groups (structural) as an indirect 
control for quality and case mix. Watt et al. [41] used 
Medicare certification (structural) and accreditation 
(structural) as proxies for quality. Sherman [37] used the 
same hospital in his comparative case study, assuring control 
for quality on all three (structural, process, and outcome) 
dimensions. Anderson and Steinberg [5] constructed their own 
measure of readmission rates (for the same illness) for 
21,043 Medicare beneficiaries (1974-1977). They found that 
diagnosis, bed size (number of beds), and the urban/rural 
distinction were significant predictors of readmission rate 
(outcome). Construction of a direct measure of readmission 
rate (for the same illness) requires clinical judgement, 
however, and no readily available data on readmission rates 
exist. The work of Anderson and Steinberg [5] is therefore 
important, in that other easily measurable attributes were 
found to be significant predictors of the readmission rate 
construct. The Medicare case mix index is derived from 
discharge diagnoses, and was included in the study along with 
number of beds and county codes. These variables each served 
to provide indirect proxy effects for readmission rate, as 
indicated by the Anderson and Steinberg [5] findings. 
Both Herzlinger and Krasker [24] and Sherman [37] have 
attempted to incorporate adjustments for social costs in 
their research on comparative hospital performance. Sherman 
[37] adjusted bond interest rates for tax exempt status and 
imputed income taxes in the NP setting. Herzlinger and 
Krasker [24] also imputed income taxes at the marginal rate 
for the income level of the NP hospitals, and adjusted tax 
exempt bond interest rates as well. Neither of the studies 
adjusted for property tax or input factor sales tax 
exemptions . 
Adjustments to interest rates require the identification 
of comparable risk FP/NP bonds. Herzlinger and Krasker [24] 
used rates, term, and size of the bonds to identify 
comparable interest rates. Income tax adjustments, however, 
can be problematical. Both Sherman [37] and Herzlinger and 
Krasker [24] implicitly assume that it is appropriate to 
impute taxes on NP hospitals for proper comparison. Conrad 
[13], however, uses Agency theory and capital market theory 
to argue that under cost based reimbursement, the granting of 
additional reimbursement for a return on equity capital 
(i.e., a reimbursement for the cost of equity capital) to 
FPs, but not to NPs (as has been Medicare policy) is 
tantamount to a 100% tax on NP equity returns. FPs, on the 
other hand, pay a marginal tax of roughly one-half that 
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amount—NP philanthropy not withstanding. He argues that 
philanthropy constitutes a secondary investment market for 
capital, and that returns in the primary capital markets are 
a signal of returns required (i.e., opportunity costs) in the 
secondary (philanthropic) market. Conrad [13] states, 
The philanthropist will demand a demonstration that 
the value of the hospital's investment is equivalent 
to that of financial opportunities of comparable 
risk, even though the payoff to donated capital is 
in nonpecuniary terms, (e.g., charity care, etc.) 
Presumably, these nonpecuniary returns are evaluated 
after consideration of tax benefits also received by the 
philanthropist. Conrad [13] further states, concerning the 
hospitals search for capital, that: 
Whether payment is in the form of interest on debt 
or the search costs incurred by non-[profits] in 
seeking to attract philanthropy, these are real 
social costs which cannot be avoided. 
Therefore, failure to reimburse NPs for a return on 
equity (by otherwise cost based payors) will result in NPs 
not providing the net intangible returns on investment which 
are valued by the philanthropist. 
The implication would seem to be that if NPs pay a hidden 
100% tax on returns to equity, the imputation, as both 
Herzlinger and Krasker [24] and Sherman [37] have advocated, 
would be adjustment in the wrong direction. Conrad's [13] 
reasoning would imply that eliminating the after-tax return 
17 
on equity component of the FP hospitals profits would be a 
more appropriate experimental adjustment. Furthermore, 
Conrad [13] argues that since both FP and NP hospitals 
compete in essentially the same product and capital markets, 
a competitive price based reimbursement system (rather than 
cost, or cost plus return on equity) would generate its own 
returns on equity through earned profit. The system he 
advocates is similar to the recent Medicare PPS program 
(Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) [18]) which 
was introduced for the first time as a 25% portion of 
Medicare reimbu rs emen t s during the fiscal period covered by 
the research presented herein. The partial introduction of a 
fixed price reimbursement system, therefore, alters the NP 
return on equity position. FPs, however, continue to receive 
an additional reimbursement for return on equity, which NPs 
are denied. The implications for experimental tax 
adjustments would therefore be to support an elimination of 
return on equity from FP hospital profits, rather than to 
impute taxes on NPs. This was essentially the position taken 
in defining the variables used in this study. 
Under either view of adjustment for tax exempt status, 
however, real cash flow effects exist which cannot be 
eliminated—and any attempt to do so would require an 
elaborate set of unrealistic assumptions which may only tend 
to weaken any comparative analysis. The experimental 
benefits of such attempts may be far outweighed by the loss 
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in data reliability incurred. 
Actual taxes by hospital were not available to this study 
due to data limitations. Medicare return on equity for 
proprietary providers was available, however, and was 
incorporated in the analysis as a potential alternative. 
Sherman [37] also raises the issue of differences in 
accounting methods across FP/NP hospitals. He advocates 
incorporation of endowment funds, donations, etc., of NPs 
into the analysis. The differences in accounting approaches 
across the FP/NP organization types are also important to the 
extent that they may reflect differing objectives of the 
respective suppliers of equity capital. Fund reporting may 
be viewed as a means of providing signals associated with the 
use of specific purpose funds in the generation of the 
particular intangible returns valued by the philanthropist. 
To the extent that real valued managerial decisions rewarded 
by the philanthropist (via fund reporting) may differ from 
the decisions rewarded by the FP investor (via profit 
reporting), the research expectation would be that there 
would be systematic ex post observable differences in the 
production, financing and investment performance of 
management—given a consistent, effective set of accounting 
(measurement) attributes, and design of incentive (reward) 
programs within each of the respective organization types. 
Both real valued decision effects and the effects of 
accounting choices may simultaneously influence the 
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observable (reported) measures of managerial performance (see 
Hogan [25]) within each of the respective FP/NP organization 
types. The use of Medicare cost report data in the proposed 
study served as a partial control for variations in 
accounting attributes, since the cost reports must comply 
with Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) standards 
and are subject to HCFA audit. The data sample included cost 
reports which spanned a wide range of audit attention (see 
Table 4), and audit status was incorporated into the analysis 
as a partial proxy for degree of accounting compliance. It 
may also be argued, however, that the degree of audit 
attention for Medicare cost reporting purposes is the result 
of other real valued management choices which have attendant 
reimbursement cash flow effects. Therefore, a dual 
identification may exist, which presents a limitation to the 
use of audit status as a proxy variable. 
Items such as property donations, investment income from 
restricted and unrestricted funds, other income- 
contributions, donations, and bequests, and number of unpaid 
worker full-time equivalents (FTEs) were readily available in 
the data sources and were also incorporated into the 
analysis, as Sherman [37] has suggested. 
Assessment of the association of incentives and 
performance may also be affected by intervening bond covenant 
and political cost relationships. Hogan [25] has reviewed a 
wide range of measures which may proxy for such mitigating 
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effects—typically debt ratios and size measures. Use of 
such amounts as proxies for bond covenant and political cost 
effects, however, can be problematical, since they may also 
be identified as (real valued) decision variables (see Hogan 
[25]). Hogan [25] used actual bond covenant provisions and 
limits as improved proxies, but such data were not available 
in the data set used in this study. 
In order to control for potential intervening effects of 
these economic factors, both size and debt measures were 
incorporated into the analysis on a hospital specific basis. 
Measures of size on a multihospital system level were also 
incorporated into the analysis. Figure 1 depicts the 
relationships of the economic factors discussed above, within 
the Agency theory framework. The intervening effects on the 
theoretic constucts in functional form are represented in 
Figure 2, along with the proxy variables. 
Both the Sherman [37] and Herzlinger and Krasker [24] 
studies also provide inflation adjustments to their hospital 
financial data. Although not specifically a differential 
social cost, inflation adjustments can be both important, and 
problematical, as well. Any differences in local wage 
scales, input factor prices, or regional inflation effects 
were indirectly proxied in this study by the region, State, 
and county designation codes specific to each of the sample 
hospitals. Direct, specific price level (SPL) adjustments 
related to asset age or net monetary position effects were 
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not possible in this study, as the data set provided no 
direct information on asset ages or specific monetary 
assets. Coyne [14] used accumulated depreciation/gross plant 
assets as a proxy measure of asset age. Accumulated 
depreciation was not available in the data set, but such a 
proxy for asset age poses considerable problems in any 
event. Most notably, when an old hospital is newly acquired, 
Medicare regulations allow the assets to be revalued (see 
Renn [33]). Revaluation, along with differing depreciation 
methods and useful life estimates, renders accumulated 
depreciation/gross plant assets crossectiona1ly incomparable 
with regard to age of physical asset prices. 
An alternative approach, which was possible given the 
data set, was to estimate remaining useful life of fixed 
assets as total net fixed assets/depreciation expense for 
fixed assets. This proxy, however, does not estimate past 
age, and is subject to the same problems of asset 
revaluation, alternative depreciation methods, and useful 
life estimates, as the former proxy. The latter measure was 
included in the analysis as a weak age proxy; however, its 
interpretation is subject to considerable limitations. 
Inflation adjustments based on unreliable accounting based 
age proxies may introduce spurious error into the data, and 
were therefore not included in this study. However, regional 
price level differences were indirectly proxied by including 
the above-mentioned location designators. Nonetheless, 
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inability to appropriately determine the age of asset prices 
requires that the associated limitations to the analysis and 
results of the study must be recognized. 
Testable Hypotheses 
The research questions addressed in this study were 
designed to examine the association of hospital financial and 
operating performance variables with FP/NP incentive 
structures, under the first year of the Medicare "flat rate" 
based PPS reimbursement program. The majority of previous 
work in the area of comparative hospital performance has 
relied upon univariate statistics or methodologies requiring 
orthogonality in the data (e.g., Berry [9], Bays [6], Elnicki 
[21], Coyne [14], Pattison and Katz [31], Renn et al. [33], 
Watt et al. [41]). At the same time, numerous and complex 
intercorrelations among hospital financial and operating 
variables have been documented (e.g., Berry [9], Rafferty and 
Schweitzer [32], Elnicki [21], Becker and Steinwald [8], 
Coyne [14]). The lack of appropriate statistical and 
experimental controls for such intercorrelations may have 
resulted in distorted significance levels, and draws into 
question the validity of previous research conclusions. 
Coyne [14], in his study comparing system and independent 
hospitals, has noted that interrelationships among the 
indicators have not been attended to in prior research. It 
is therefore not clear which financial and operating 
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performance measures, if any, differentiate between FP/NP 
multihospital systems or FP/NP nonsystem hospitals, and to 
what degree their discriminatory power is statistically 
significant. Some indicators of possible FP operating 
strategy, however, suggest that location and turnover 
measures may be expected to be the relatively more important 
FP/NP performance discriminators, if performance differences 
are found to exist at all. The research questions may 
therefore be stated as: 
1. Do financial and operating performance variables 
discriminate between FP/NP hospitals, after 
controlling for the intercorrelation structure among 
the variables? 
2. Given that the performance variables do 
discriminate between FP/NP hospitals, do location 
and turnover variables have the relatively greatest 
discriminatory power? 
Stating these two questions in the form of null 
hypotheses: 
Hq^: Financial and operating performance 
variables do not discriminate between FP/NP 
hospitals, after controlling for the 
intercorre1ation structure among the variables. 
Location and turnover measures do not have 
relatively greater discriminatory power than other 
performance variables found to discriminate between 
FP/NP hospitals. 
If Hqi is rejected by the analysis, support will be given 
to the proposition that the profit incentive is associated 
with significant performance differences among hospitals. 
The rejection of will lend support to the proposition 
that certain performance dimensions are more important in 
differentiating between FP/NP hospitals than other 
dimensions. Each of the above research outcomes will have 
direct relevance to reimbursement program policy makers in 
identifying and assessing the importance of decision 
variables controllable by hospital managers. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources 
The primary data source was the Medicare PPS1 tape, a 
public use file extracted from the new Hospital Cost Report 
Information System (HCRIS) for the first year of PPS. The 
file contained data from Hospital Cost Report Form 
HCFA-2552-84 as well as data from other HCFA records. 
Although the first year of PPS includes hospital cost 
reporting periods beginning on or after October 1, 1983, and 
before October 1, 1984, the actual file contained hospitals 
with reporting periods extending throughout calendar years 
1983, 1984, and 1985. 
The Medicare Provider Case Mix Index (CMI) file for 
Federal fiscal year October 1, 1983 through September 30, 
1984, was the secondary data source. 
The AHA Directory of Multihospital Systems, 1985 edition 
[1] (1984 data) was used as a means of identifying system 
hospitals by name and system affiliation. 
The Medicare Non-Long Term Care Alphabetic Listing of 
Hospitals, as of October 2, 1985, the AHA Guide to the Health 
Care Field, 1985 edition [2] (1984 data), and the Department 
of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing 
Administration, HCFA Publication 15-11, Medicare Provider 
Reimbursement Manual Part II-Provider Cost Reporting Forms 
and Instructions, Form HCFA-2552-84-Chapter 15, as of April, 
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1985 [19], were referenced as tertiary sources. 
The hospital cost report information consisted of a 
summarization of the approximately one hundred page cost 
report. Form HCFA-2552-84, required of all Medicare 
providers, as well as excerpts from other HCFA records. The 
cost report summarization contained 544 data items for each 
of more than 6,000 hospitals nationwide. The machine 
readable tape first became available in July of 1986; thus, 
the 1984 primary data source used in this study was the 
latest available data set of its kind. At standard Medicare, 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) charges of $20.00 per cost 
report, an equivalent number of hard copy documents would 
have cost over $120,000 and would have consisted of over 
600,000 pages of information--which illustrates the data 
obstacles which have confronted the previous research 
efforts. The cost report data contained a broad array of 
detailed identifying, categoric, operating, cost, and revenue 
data, and provided condensed financial statement data for 
each hospital. 
The Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual [19] (hard 
copy) , cited above, served to help resolve questions 
concerning the nature of specific data items contained in the 
file. 
The Medicare Provider CMI file was also a Medicare 
generated, machine readable file, organized by Medicare 
provider number. The tape contained 1984 quarterly and 
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annual CMIs for each provider for the Federal fiscal year. 
Each 1984 index--both quarterly and annual--was accompanied 
by the number of Medicare discharges from which the 
respective index was constructed. The file also contained 
the annual 1981 CMIs frequently used in prior research, as 
well as the fiscal year end (FYE) for each provider. The 
1984 index was not only concurrent with the sample period, 
but was also a more reliable measure of Medicare case mix 
than the 1981 index, in that, the 1984 index was estimated 
from a better coded data base, using improved classification 
techniques [May 23, 1986 communication with Rose Connerton, 
Senior Medicare Advisor, HCFA, Baltimore, MD ] . Thus, the 
secondary data source used in this study provided notable 
advantages over its predecessors. 
The 1985 AHA Directory of Multihospital Systems [1] (hard 
copy version) contained names, addresses, system affiliation, 
and a variety of associated data on all AHA registered, 
system affiliates for 1984. The data was cross referenced by 
system, by State, and alphabetically by hospital name. The 
directory was used as the system identification source list, 
as is the precedent in the literature. 
In the event of name discrepancies between the AHA 
Directory and the Medicare Cost Report file (e.g., Sharp 
Memorial Hospital [AHA] vs. Donald N. Sharp Memorial Hospital 
[Medicare] in California), a hard copy version of the 
Medicare Non-Long Term Care Alphabetic Listing of Hospitals 
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certified to participate in the Medicare program as of 
October 2, 1985, was used to assist in correct identification 
of the hospitals. Although the Medicare alphabetic listing 
was one year younger than the 1984 sample year, it contained 
a geographically organized (by State) alphabetic listing of 
names, addresses, number of certified beds, accreditation 
status, county code, and fiscal intermediary number (i.e., 
the code for the private insurer, e.g., Aetna, Blue Cross, 
etc., which handled the provider on a contract basis for the 
Medicare program) for each hospital, and was used to help 
verify the accuracy of the hospital identifications relative 
to the other two sources, when needed. 
The 1985 AHA Guide to the Health Care Field [2] (hard 
copy version) provided 1984 categoric information on all AHA 
registered hospitals. It served as an additional reference on 
names, addresses, services, accreditation, etc. 
Sampling Procedure 
First, a geographically organized (by State) alphabetic 
list of all hospitals by name and provider number, was 
extracted from the Cost Report file. Then, each of the 2,050 
multihospital system member hospitals (representing 378,132 
beds; AHA [1]) from the geographically organized (by State) 
alphabetic list of the AHA Directory [1] was cross 
referenced, with AHA system code, to the name and provider 
number extract. Any discrepancies in the identification of 
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hospitals were resolved by comparing both of the above 
sources to the 1985 Medicare Alphabetic Listing, as 
previously described. Direct telephone calls to over two 
hundred and fifty hospitals were made to ascertain positive 
identification of hospitals when discrepancies were otherwise 
unresolved by using the above sources. In cases where 
ownership was found to have changed, the AHA Directory [1] 
served to provide the date of record for system membership. 
When positive identification of a hospital could not be made, 
the hospital was deleted from the sample. Only twenty-nine 
such hospitals were deleted from the sample. 
Second, the resulting list of the AHA system codes with 
related system attribute data, by provider number, were 
merged with the Cost Report and CMI files for later 
analysis. All nonsystem hospitals were assigned unique 
system codes and considered to be systems of one. 
Since many of the hospitals had multiple cost report data 
appearing on the Cost Report file, selection of one report 
for each provider required a prioritization of research 
interest. The types of reports contained in the file are 
identified in Table 4. 
Although the range of reports suggests possibilities for 
future study of the association of the degree of audit 
attention with different hospital characteristics, the 
present study required both uniformity of compliance with 
HCFA reporting standards, as well as a diversity of cost 
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report status, for purposes of ascertaining the extent of 
effects of report status. 
Given these criteria, the selection of reports (one for 
each provider) was made according to the following hierarchy: 
1. Settled with audit. 
2. Settled without audit. 
3. Reopened. 
4. Audited, not settled. 
5. As submitted . 
All providers with non-twelve month reporting periods 
were deleted from the sample as well as all foreign, U.S. 
Territories, and null data set cases. The remaining cases 
were subjected to crosstabulation and a variety of 
descriptive statistics as discussed in Chapter IV. The 
descriptive statistics revealed further sample selection 
criteria based on the distribution of cost reporting FYEs. 
The deletion of twenty-three cases on FYE criteria, as well 
as another one hundred eight cases due to missing (or 
erroneous) values on the Type of Control variable, left a 
final discriminant analysis sample of 5,342 cases, computed 
as follows: 
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Total reports in file 8,773 
Less: Duplicate providers or null data set 
cases 2 ,480 
Unique provider data sets 6,293 
Less: Non-twelve month reporting period 
providers 779 
Unidentified providers 29 
U .S . Territories providers 12 
Descriptive statistics sample 5,473 
Less: Providers outside accepted FYE range 23 
Factor analysis and classification sample 5,450 
Less: Providers with missing or erroneous values 
for the Type of Control variable 108 
Discriminant analysis sample 5,342 
Ana lysis 
The research presented herein offers improvement upon 
prior work in the following ways: 
1. Multivariate statistics were used to accommodate the 
correlation structure of the hospital financial and operating 
performance variables, and direct measures of marginal 
discriminatory power were employed. That is, data reduction 
of the correlated variables was accomplished through the use 
of factor analysis and discriminatory power was assessed 
using an MDA model. 
2. A broader scope of financial and operating 
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performance measures was used than most prior research, and 
no a priori assumptions was made about directionality of the 
effects of specific measures. 
3. The 1984 Medicare Cost Report data under the first 
year of PPS (i.e., "fixed price" reimbursement vs. the old 
"cost based" reimbursement system) were used. 
4. A concurrent, 1984 measure of Medicare case mix was 
used, rather than the historic (1981) measure frequently used 
in previous studies. 
5. A national sample of Medicare certified hospitals was 
used, with accreditation status, malpractice costs, and 
physician hour related variables used as structural proxies 
for quality differences among hospitals. 
With respect to the fifth area of improvement identified 
above, it should be noted that Watt et al. [41] used Medicare 
certification and accreditation as a control for quality, but 
their sample was not national, i.e., it was limited to only 
eight states. Renn et al. [33] used 1984 audited Medicare 
cost report data in a national sample, with Medicare 
certification as a sample selection criterion, but 
accreditation was not mentioned as a control variable. The 
approach used herein combined and expanded upon the relative 
advantages of both the work of Watt et al. [41] and Renn et 
al. [33] . 
The methodological approach employed in investigating the 
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two research questions specified in Chapter II is described 
be low . 
The hospitals were first grouped according to month of 
cost reporting fiscal period end. The frequency of hospitals 
in each FYE were then correlated across system codes, across 
Type of Control, and across Medicare region (using the 
nonparametric Kendall and Spearman rank order correlation 
statistics) to assess whether such noncontemporaneous 
reporting effects would introduce systematic bias into the 
analysis. If fiscal year ends were differentially related 
to, e.g., system code, the conclusions of the FP/NP analysis 
would be confounded by a noncontemporaneous system reporting 
effect. The prior expectation was that a sufficient 
diversity in Medicare region and system code would exist in 
at least one of the FYE groups to permit meaningful analysis 
(i.e., the group frequencies would not be significantly 
different from the overall sample frequencies for system code 
and Medicare region, within at least one FYE group). 
As discussed in Chapter IV, hospitals with FYEs included 
in the period 9/84 through 8/85 were accepted as being 
sufficiently representative of the sample frequencies for 
each of the three variables tested (system code, Type of 
Control, and Medicare region). 
The specific hospital financial and operating performance 
variables were selected from those which have been found 
significant in prior hospital comparative analysis research. 
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as well as others with demonstrated correlations with 
significant variables. Additional measures with theoretic 
discriminatory potential were also included (see Coyne [14], 
Levitz and Brooke [27], Renn et al. [33], Cleverley [12], 
Bays [7], and Hogan [25]). The variables and definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
The covariance matrix of the one hundred measures defined 
in Appendix A were then subjected to multivariate factor 
analysis using the PA2 common factor model procedure provided 
within the standard Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) software package (see Tatsuoka [39]). The 
Scree test and Kaiser’s eigenvalue ( cutoff rule were used 
to identify significant factors. Varimax orthogonal rotation 
of the factors was employed to aid in interpretability. 
Obviously, the categoric data items violated the assumption 
of normality which is required in factor analysis, which must 
be recognized as a limitation. 
After a reduced set of twelve major and eighteen minor 
factors was extracted from the data (which represented 7 5.3% 
of the data variance), the set of thirty factor scores was 
computed for each hospital. Also, the highest loading raw 
data variables on each factor were identified for each 
hospital, for comparison to the factor scores in the 
subsequent discriminant analysis. The factor scores were 
then used as input to an MDA model. 
The potential for variation in incentive programs within 
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both FP and NP organizational types was proxied by using a 
condensed version (discussed in Chapter IV) of the twelve 
partitions on hospital Type of Control (a variant of the nine 
variations of NP hospital control types, and three variations 
of FP hospital control types—see Table 2). Consistency in 
effects of incentive programs within each of the hospital 
control type partitions was assumed to be sufficiently 
homogeneous, as the data set did not provide for finer 
identification of hospita 1-specific incentive program 
attributes . 
System hospitals were individually identified within the 
data set by system code, system type, and affiliation (see 
Tables 5 and 6) as well as other attributes such as number of 
facilities, beds, geographic dispersion measures, etc. 
Although there was some distribution of system types and 
codes across the various ownership Type of Control 
partitions, a correspondence existed. The divergencies 
consisted primarily of NP hospitals affiliated with FP 
systems. Accordingly, the system attributes, rather than the 
system codes, were incorporated into the analysis as a 
control for multihospital system effects. The marginal 
effects of systems in the discriminant analysis was assessed 
using a conditional deletion approach. The twelve Type of 
Control partitions served as the dependent variable (see 
Figure 3). 
Equality of covariance matrices across the control 
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partitions was tested using Box’s M test (see Altman et al. 
[4]). Since the number of observations in each partition was 
unequal, the sample proportions were used to weight the 
discriminant classification rule. Significance of the 
discriminant functions was assessed using Bartlett's 
transformation of Wilks Lambda (see Tatsuoka [39]). The 
discriminant model(s) classification results were assessed 
using the full 5,450 case sample, and the relative importance 
of each of the discriminatory variables was evaluated using 
the conditional deletion method (see Altman et al. [4]). The 
conditional deletion method was used to assess the net 
contribution of a each specific variable, given that the 
effects of all the other variables were already taken into 
account. The main advantage of the method was that each 
variables net effect was assessed relative to the entire set 
of other variables, rather than a subset of the other 
variables, as is done in stepwise methods. The variables 
were each ranked in order of relative importance based on 
their respective net contribution to the overall 
classification efficacy of the discriminant model. The 
marginal classification efficacy of the discriminant model(s) 
was assessed by using the estimated discriminant model 
coefficients to transform the set of input factor scores (or 
highest loading raw data variables) into discriminant scores 
for each hospital, and then constructing the distance metric: 
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x2ik = (yi ■ yk),(V'DkV) 1(yi - yk) + |v’Dkv|-2^P 
whe re: 
i,k 
D 
= the discriminant score for hospital i 
= the mean score for incentive group k 
= the group covariance matrix of the canonical 
discriminant functions for incentive group k 
V = the vector of discriminant weights 
p, = sample proportion for group k 
The posterior probability of incentive group membership for 
each hospital was computed as: 
X‘ 
ik 
P ( G Y . ) 
i ^ 
i.k 
K 
U x 
j=i 
ij 
i.e., each hospital was classified as belonging to group 
2 * 
which had the closest centroid (the smallest X for all 
ik 
k, which yielded the highest posterior probability estimate 
for the hospitals membership in that group k) . This was done 
with and without deletion of each predictor variable. 
The marginal classification results were arrayed in the 
format of the confusion matrix, and percent correct 
classification was assessed relative to a sample proportions 
classification model. 
The entire discriminant analysis process was repeated 
using the highest loading raw data variables as input to the 
MDA model(s) instead of the factor scores. The 
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classification results of the two versions were then compared 
on the basis of classification efficacy. The operating 
performance raw data variables individually having marginally 
greatest relative significance in the discriminant functions 
were then assessed on a group mean basis, concerning their 
potential role as managerial decision variables associated 
with performance differences across hospital incentive 
groups . 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data Attributes 
The data sample was subjected to a variety of descriptive 
statistics. First, of the 249 multihospital systems listed 
in the AHA Directory [1], 243 (98%) were represented in the 
data set. Of the 5,473 hospitals in the descriptive 
statistics sample, 1,654 (30%) were system members and 3,819 
(70%) were independent hospitals. Each category had 
previously had an equivalent number of non-twelve month 
reporting period cases (14% and 12% respectively) deleted. 
The AHA Directory [1] listed 2,050 system affiliated 
hospitals; therefore, the sample contained 1,654/2,050 or 81% 
of all AHA registered system affiliated hospitals. The 
system/independent sample proportions of 30%/70% were 
consistent with the 1979 proportions cited by Renn et al. 
[33] of 26%/74% for all community hospitals in the United 
States. Further, after adjustment for missing or erroneous 
values on the Type of Control variable (5,473 - 108 = 5,365), 
the sample contained 15% FP and 85% NP hospitals. Broken 
down by system/independent, 30% of the system hospitals were 
FP and 70% were NP, while 9% of the independent hospitals 
were FP and 91% were NP. In comparison, the 1985 AHA 
Directory [1] cited 42% of the registered system hospitals as 
being affiliates of FP systems and 58% as being affiliates of 
NP systems. Although the AHA proportions differed from the 
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sample, not all affiliates of FP systems were FP hospitals 
(e.g., some NP hospitals were contract managed by FP 
systems), which may have accounted for some of the difference 
(i.e., 30% system FP vs. 42%). 
In terms of categoric variables, 91% of the sample 
hospitals (after adjustment for 17 missing value cases) filed 
under PPS, 7% filed under the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) and 2% filed under some other 
payment system. Therefore, the majority of the sample was 
subject to the effects of the first year of PPS. 
By Type of Control, the sample contained the proportions 
listed in Table 2. Control types 3, 6, and 7 contained 
twelve, twenty-one, and five cases respectively which were 
all less than the thirty case minimum required for 
statistical validity in the subsequent discriminant 
analyses. These groups were therefore combined with other 
groups that were considered to be most similar in type of 
control. Group 3 (Proprietary, Individual) was combined with 
Group 5 (Proprietary, Partnership) under the rationale that 
proprietorships and partnerships have the most similar types 
of organizational control. Group 7 (Governmental, 
City-County) could have been combined with either Group 8 
(Governmental, County) or Group 11 (Governmental, City) since 
attributes of both would potentially exist in the Group 7 
data. However, since Group 8 was the smaller group, Groups 7 
and 8 were combined. Together, Groups 7 and 8 constituted a 
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combined total of only 2.8% of the final sample; and 
therefore, any potential bias introduced by their arbitrary 
combination was expected to be minimal. Finally, Group 6 
(Governmental, Federal) which consisted of twenty-one cases, 
was considered to be administratively different enough from 
all other groups to warrant combination with the Group 12 
(Governmental, Other) category. Since Group 12 (187 cases) 
was expected to display within-group diversity, the addition 
of the twenty-one Federal hospitals was considered to be 
simply adding another dimension to that diversity. The 
resulting combination of Groups 6 and 12 constituted only 
3.9% of the final sample, so again, any bias introduced by 
the combination was expected to be minimal. 
The final proportions were as follows for the condensed 
Type of Control categories: 
Group 
Sample 
Proportion 
1 13.2% 
2 42 .0 
4 12 .2 
3 & 5 3.2 
7 & 8 2 .8 
9 11.7 
10 4 .0 
11 7 .0 
6 & 12 3 .9 
100.0% 
On Type of Hospital, 90.3% of the sample (adjusted for 68 
missing values) consisted of General Short Term hospitals. 
The sample distribution is presented in Table 3. 
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Adjusted for three missing value cases, 76% of the sample 
hospitals did not purchase management/support services (HCFA 
definition) while 24% did purchase such services. This 
corresponded to the proportions of 88.5% owned hospitals 
(arbitrarily considering independent hospitals as owned, for 
purposes of comparison), 2.1% leased, 1.8% sponsored, and 
7.6% contract managed, according to the AHA definition, as 
represented in the data sample. The discrepancy between the 
HCFA and AHA data (76% vs. 88.5%) may have been due to 
definitional differences, the arbitrary inclusion of all 
independent hospitals as being owned, or possibly date of 
record. Both variables were included in the subsequent 
analyses in order to minimize potential bias effects inherent 
in one definition or the other, of the purchased management 
services variable. 
On System Type, independent hospitals were arbitrarily 
classified as systems of one, and each independent hospital 
was given a unique system code. As previously mentioned, 91% 
of the independents were NP and 9% were FP. The system 
hospitals represented approximately 30% of the sample. The 
overall sample proportions for System Type are presented in 
Table V . 
Again, 98% (243/249) of all AHA registered systems were 
represented in the sample. The six omitted systems were 
(with type, number of facilities, and number of beds in 
parentheses): 
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AHA 
System 
Code System Name 
4125 
4135 
5745 
7005 
9855 
9995 
Shriners Childrens Hospitals (NP, 19, 887) 
Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital ( NP , 2, 98) 
Sisters of Charity of Our Lady of Mercy (CC, 2, 464) 
Youngstown Hospital Association (NP, 3, 981) 
Camelback Hospitals, Inc. (NP, 2, 170) 
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (NP, 2, 492) 
As can be observed, all of the missing systems were very 
small, except for the Shriners Hospitals. Apart from the 
Shriners Hospitals, there was a total of only eleven missing 
facilities. The Shriners Childrens Hospitals were not 
included in the data sample as they were presumably not 
Medicare certified hospitals (although some childrens 
hospitals may be Medicaid certified, or may include 
non-children related care). Selected by size (greater than 
or equal to twenty facilities), the major systems represented 
in the sample are presented in Appendix B. 
Cost Report Status was distributed within the sample 
(after adjusting for three missing value cases) as presented 
in Table 4 . 
All Inclusive Rate Provider status existed for 1.3% of 
the sample, with 98.7% of the sample not having such status 
(twelve missing value cases). Funded Depreciation existed 
for 53% of the sample, while 47% of the hospitals did not 
fund depreciation (two missing value cases). Seventy-nine 
percent of the sample hospitals were accredited; 21% were not 
accredited (as of a 10—2—85 date of record—which was limited 
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in that it may have been as much as one year after a given 
hospitals cost reporting FYE) . 
The two categoric variables remaining are Medicare Region 
and Cost Reporting Period FYE. Since analysis of these two 
variables, as well as the system code data, is related, all 
three variables are discussed together. First, the 
distribution of sample hospitals across Medicare Regions was 
as presented in Table 1. 
The distribution of sample hospitals with cost reporting 
period FYEs within a given month (two missing value cases) 
were as presented in Table 8. 
As can be noted from Table 8, 9/84, 12/84, and 6/85 were 
the most frequent FYE months. Also, if one hospital had a 
1/84 FYE while another had a 12/85 FYE, their respective 
reporting periods would have been separated by a full 
intervening year (calendar year 1984). This condition was 
considered to be problematical from a research design 
perspective. Furthermore, although the high significance 
levels were undoubtedly driven by the large sample size, 
simple correlations (Kendall’s Tau B, one tailed tests) 
existed between FYE and Medicare Region (.10005, significant 
at the .0000 level), FYE and System Code (-.0629, significant 
at the .0000 level) as well as between FYE and Type of 
Control (.04596, significant at the .0000 level). The 
frequency distribution of hospital system codes, types of 
control, and regions within each FYE were also each tested 
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for correlation with the sample as a whole. This was done 
using two tailed tests of both the Kendall and Spearman 
nonparametric rank order correlations (the Kendall statistic 
providing the more stringent test) for the respective sample 
frequencies on each of the three variables. This was done to 
observe the similarity of a given FYE to the total sample 
frequencies for each of System Code, Type of Control, and 
Medicare Region. Table 9 presents the significance of each 
correlation coefficient of FYE with the sample as a whole, 
for each of the three variables’ observed frequency 
dist ributions. 
Perhaps the most notable feature of Table 9 was the 
consistency of high significance of each of the correlations 
of FYE with the sample as a whole on all of the variable 
frequency distributions tested—particularly for the period 
from 9/84 to 8/85. Although, again, the high significance 
levels may have been driven by the large sample size, this 
result indicated that each of the FYE months between 9/84 and 
8/85, inclusive, were similar to the sample as a whole, as 
evaluated by observed frequencies for each of System Code, 
Type of Control, and Medicare Region. This period contained 
99.5% of the sample cases and represented two full contiguous 
fiscal years (9/83 - 8/84 and 9/84 - 8/85). By truncating 
the sample at 9/84 and 8/85, the problem of an intervening 
year existing between cases was eliminated. Based on the 
simple correlations, subject to their limitations, the 
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remaining sample was considered to be sufficiently similar 
(within each FYE) to the sample frequencies on each of the 
variables tested, to warrant analysis of the remaining data 
set as a single group. Although two fiscal years were 
spanned, 83.2% of all of the cases were contained within only 
three FYEs (9/84, 12/84, and 6/85). These three FYEs were 
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within nine months of each other, thus mitigating, somewhat, 
the noncontemporaneous reporting effect. A total of 
twenty-three cases (twenty-one plus two missing value cases) 
was deleted from the sample by this temporal truncation. 
The final comment with regard to the HCRIS file data 
relates to the issue of data error. The Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) codes (for use in 
urban/rural distinction) were missing in 3,105 cases. The 
county codes were missing in 854 cases. Also, for about 500 
cases, a number of variables had spurious negative values. 
For all but forty-three cases in the final 9/84 - 8/85 data 
set (5,450 cases), replacement county codes were obtained 
from the Medicare 10-2-85 Alphabetic Listing. However, 
obtaining replacements for the over 3,000 SMSA codes was not 
considered feasible, as it would have involved verifying 
names, addresses, and cities for each of the 3,105 cases, as 
well as inputting the data individually on the computer. 
Consequently, county codes were relied upon to proxy for the 
finer SMSA distinction. Since the urban/rural distinction 
was not as finely proxied by county codes, the association 
found by Anderson and Steinberg [5] of the urban/rural 
distinction with quality of care (as measured by readmission 
rate) was potentially dampened. However, additional proxies 
for quality of care were available in the data set, which may 
have helped to compensate for the loss in reliability. The 
additional measures included Physician Hours per Case, 
Interns and Residents Cost per Physician Hour, Medicare 
Malpractice Costs, and Reimbursable Hospital Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums and/or Fund Contributions. 
The problem of spurious negative values was discussed 
over the telephone with the persons responsible for 
overseeing the HCRIS PPS1 data file project. The response 
was that for cases where Allowances and Discounts on 
Patients* Accounts were found to be added to gross revenues 
to arrive at net revenues (rather than being subtracted), 
that was how the data was actually appearing on the reports 
submitted by the providers. No conceptual explanation was 
offered. It was conceivable (but not likely, in light of the 
other variables with spurious negative signs) that since the 
account. Allowances and Discounts on Patients' Accounts, 
contained contractual adjustments, possibly in some cases 
there were sizable positive contractual adjustments 
generating the addition to, rather than subtraction from, 
gross revenues. Both net revenues and net income were 
positively affected by the computation. The seemingly more 
plausible explanation, in light of other comments that were 
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made concerning problems with vendors' software programs in 
the computation of Medicare patient days, was that perhaps 
some of the spurious negative signs were generated by 
inconsistent use of parentheses on different providers’ 
reports, or possibly programming or data entry problems. The 
potential for systematic occurrence of such data errors was 
indeterminant. Such occurrences of unexpected negative signs 
appeared in about 500 cases, or approximately 10% of the 
final sample. Data error, of course, weakened the power of 
the statistical tests, and the ensuing limitation to the 
research results must be recognized. In both the Return on 
Assets (ROA) and ROE measures, it was evident that a spurious 
small denominator problem may also have existed, in addition 
to possible negative value effects, which tended to distort 
group averages. Both of these variables contributed 
relatively little to the subsequent discriminant analyses. 
Although conditional deletion of these variables from the 
discriminant model revealed that they ranked relatively low 
in effect on the models classification efficacy, any 
potential for enhancing discriminatory power that may have 
otherwise existed in ROA and ROE, was not realized in the 
model. 
The annual case mix data was taken from the 1984 Medicare 
Provider CMI file, and had missing values in only thirty-two 
cases . 
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Factor Analysis 
As the SPSS statistical software package only 
accommodated up to 100 variables, the data set had to be 
limited to those measures considered most representative of 
the constructs of interest to the study, notably: debt, 
size, turnover, and a variety of other financial and 
operating performance measures. Appendix A presents each of 
the 100 measures used in the factor analysis. 
The SPSS PA2 procedure — the common factor model—was 
used, with Varimax rotation. An eigenvalue cutoff rule of 
1.0 was used, which was also consistent with the cutoff 
suggested by subsequent Scree diagrams (see Figure 4). A 
total of 5,450 cases was used for the factor analysis. 
Although a singularity problem in the correlation matrix 
occurred, and only one iteration could be completed, a total 
of thirty unrotated factors was extracted, accounting for 
75.3% of the variance in the data. Those variables with 
communa1ities exceeding one after the first iteration were 
removed, to observe effects on the estimation procedure. A 
subsequent total of four iterations was achieved, with no 
appreciable difference in results. Consequently, for the 
conceptual interest in the removed variables, the entire set 
was used, and one iteration was accepted. 
The rotated set of thirty factors produced twelve major 
factors (again using a X >_ 1.0 cutoff rule) which accounted 
for 83.3% of the 75.3% of variance extracted from the data. 
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The Scree diagram for the rotated factors is presented in 
Figure 4. As can be noted from the Scree diagram, at twelve 
factors, the diagram began to "tail off" considerably. This 
indicated that, consistent with the X >_ 1.0 cutoff rule, the 
first twelve factors most significantly accounted for the 
major variation in the data. 
The rotated set of factors was therefore classified as 
containing twelve major factors ( X 1.0) and eighteen minor 
factors ( /l < 1.0) extracted from the data. Alternatively, 
the data may be interpreted as consisting of 100 imperfect 
measures, each depicting some aspect of only twelve major and 
eighteen minor factors of variation in the hospital financial 
and operating performance data. Upon examination of the 
factor loadings (S), the high degree of polarization achieved 
within factors resulted in a relatively easily interpretable 
set of underlying factor constructs. For example, Factor 1 
had all loadings in the order of either .999 or .181, with 
the .999 order loadings being all on the common size measures 
of expenditure for different services. Hence, Factor 1 was 
readily interpreted as a Service Mix factor, explaining 32.3% 
of the 75.3% of variation extracted from the data. Similar 
interpretationa1 analysis was applied to each of the thirty 
factors. The factor attributes are presents in Tables 10 and 
11 for the major and minor factors respectively. Briefly, 
the 12 major factors of variation in hospital financial and 
operating performance were interpreted as: 
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1. Service mix 
2 . Ancillaries 
3. System Attributes 
4. Profitability per Case 
5. 0 ccupancy 
6. Size 
7. Turnover 
8. Location 
9. Debt per Case 
10. LOS 
11. Maternity 
12. Cost per Day 
The 18 minor factors were interpreted as: 
13. Capital Intensity 
14. Type of Hospital 
15. Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) 
16. Local Market Share 
17. Reimbursabililty 
18. System Affiliation 
19. Case Mix 
20. ROA 
21. Patient Volume 
22. Other Special Care 
23. Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 
24. Speech Pathology 
25. All Inclusive Rate 
26. Intermediate Care 
27. ROE 
28. Other Long-Term Care 
29. Liquidity 
30. Coronary Care Unit (CCU) 
Factor 1 (Service Mix) accounted for the largest portion 
of variation in the data, due in part to the fact that the 
common size service cost variables constituted the greatest 
single number of similar variables in the data set. The 
inherent variability within each service cost ratio, however, 
did differ considerably. A few of the common size ratios had 
very small loadings under factor analyses using two or three 
different alternatives for other variable definitions. They 
were therefore deleted from the analysis to permit 
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introduction of additional variables of conceptual interest. 
The loadings on this first major factor were highly polarized 
(i.e., either of order .999 or order .181) and entirely 
consistent (i.e., all and only common size service cost 
variables loaded on the factor) making its interpretation 
quite clear as depicting a service mix dimension within the 
data. On the contrary, Factor 2 was more equivocal in 
interpretation. It contained high loadings for the two 
malpractice cost variables (X91 and X92), Ancillary Markup 
and % Ancillary Charges (X26 and X45 respectively), 
Outpatient Markup (X26) and % Medical Education Costs. 
Perhaps the high observed statistical association of the 
variables may be attributable to a situation whereby 
hospitals with, e.g., high markup on ancillary and outpatient 
services, and a relatively high proportion of ancillary 
revenues, had small commitment to medical education 
endeavors, and thereby incurred differential malpractice 
costs. This scenario is not unlike that suggested by prior 
research (e.g., Pattison and Katz [31] and Lewin et al. 
[28]). The significance of this factor in discriminating 
between FP/NP hospitals is addressed in the subsequent review 
of the discriminant results. The observation of interest to 
the factor analysis is the considerably high proportion of 
variance explained (8.5% of the extracted variance), the high 
loadings (nearly all order .9), and the large eigenvalue 
(5.30) associated with this second factor. The 
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interpretation "Ancillaries" was given as a generality for 
the observed cluster of ancillary, outpatient, and medical 
education departments. 
The third factor (System Attributes) was again readily 
interpretable. All of the high loadings were of order .9, 
and the nature of the variables was highly consistent, i.e., 
Number of Facilities, Beds, Counties Spanned, States Spanned, 
and Regions Spanned by System. Even the highest of the low 
loading variables (S = .33751) was a system related variable 
(Means of System Affiliation). This third, and sizable 
dimension of variation in the data, was therefore interpreted 
as depicting the variability due to differential system 
attributes. The large eigenvalue (5.05) and 8.1% of 
extracted variance were consistent with Coyne’s [14] finding 
of differences attributable to the system/independent 
distinction. 
Factor 4 (Profitability per Case) was the first factor 
with negative loadings. The directions of the signs were as 
would be expected, in that the two cost variables (Routine 
Service Costs per Case and Cost per Case) were negatively 
related (being the lesser two of the four loadings) with the 
two profitability measures (Adjusted Profit per Case and Cash 
Flow per Case). The interpretation of the factor was based 
on the two higher loading variables (order .94 vs. order 
.62) . 
Factor 5 (Occupancy) again reflected a highly consistent 
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set of variables, i.e., Occupancy Rate (.92416), Adjusted 
Average Daily Census (.86438), and Adjusted Patient Days 
(.86376). This factor accounted for 6.1% of the extracted 
variance, with a relatively large eigenvalue (3.77), 
indicating its relative importance in explaining variation 
across hospitals in the sample. 
Factor 6 (Size) had the least polarized loadings set of 
all the twelve major factors. The two highest loadings were 
.67543 (Adjusted Admissions) and .56246 (Average Beds per 
Facility in System). The next highest loading (S < .50) was 
.39266 (% Blood Storing, Processing, and Transfusion Costs). 
This factor did have a considerable eigenvalue (2.74) and 
accounted for 4.4% of the extracted variance. Noting that X9 
(Average Beds per Facility in System) simply reflected total 
beds for the hospital in cases of independent hospitals, the 
admissions and beds related variables were considered to be 
hospital size measures. The interesting positive association 
of % Blood Storing Costs with this factor indicated variation 
of such facilities with hospital size. 
Factor 7 (Turnover) had highly polarized, consistent 
loadings and explained 4.1% of the extracted variance. This 
was a notable finding, as turnover reflects an important 
aspect of managerial operating strategy. The relative 
importance of this factor in the subsequent discriminant 
analyses is addressed later in this chapter. The two highest 
loading variables were X34 (Plant Asset Turnover) and X35 
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(Current Liability Turnover). Surprisingly, total Asset 
Turnover (X33) loaded exceptionally low (order S = .04 or 
less) except for a loading of ”.18606 on Factor 20 (ROA) and 
.23599 on Factor 26 (Intermediate Care). These findings 
indicated a weak association of Turnover with Return on 
Assets, as would be expected by definition (i.e., ROA = 
profit margin X turnover), as well as a modest, positive 
association with intermediate term care facilities. The 
negative loading for asset turnover (X33) on the ROA factor 
might be considered indicative of the fact that perhaps as 
total asset turnover decreased, ROA increased due to more 
than offsetting increases in profit margin. However, Profit 
Margin (X23) did not load on the ROA factor (order .001). 
Therefore, the negative loading for X33 on the ROA factor 
(given also the small magnitude of the loading) may have been 
due to spurious data values, as previously discussed. 
The eighth factor (Location) was also highly polarized 
and was generally consistent with the Anderson and Steinberg 
[5] study on hospital quality in that it had a (weak) 
negative association with variable X73 (Accreditation). The 
factor loadings were .98294 for X3 (Medicare Region) and 
.92787 for X7 (Medicare Region with Greatest Net Patient 
Revenues for System). The Location factor explained 3.2% of 
extracted variance and had an eigenvalue of 1.98. This 
factor was consistent with prior research (e.g., Coyne [17], 
Lewin et al. [28], Feldstein and Shuttinga [22], and Graef 
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[23]) in that it depicted variation, in general, of location 
across hospitals. It is an important managerial decision 
variable, and hence, was a relevant finding for this study. 
The relative importance of Location in discriminating between 
Type of Control groups is addressed later in this chapter. 
Factor 9 (Debt per Case) was interpreted based on the 
essentially cash payment nature implied by the highest 
loading variables. Variable X42 (Debt per Case) loaded 
.81054 on this factor, while X31 (Physicians’ Remuneration 
per Case) and X30 (Routine Service Costs per Case) loaded 
.60344 and .52689 on this factor, respectively. Each of 
these variables was considered to require significant cash 
outlays via e.g., debt service and service capacity costs. 
Variable X39 (Total Debt to Total Assets) did not load highly 
on any of the factors, but was perhaps explained by the more 
detailed measures which loaded on the Debt per Case factor. 
This factor accounted for 2.8% of extracted variance and had 
an eigenvalue of 1.75, again indicating the relative 
importance of this factor in explaining variation across 
hospitals in the data set. Another interesting finding was 
the small positive loading (S = .35107) of LOS on this 
factor. Perhaps the longer the average patient stay, the 
higher the cash outflow burden on the hospital. This 
rationale would be generally consistent with the use of LOS 
as a proxy for resource consumption, as was done in the 
development of the Medicare Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) 
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classification system. 
Factor 10 (Length of Stay) also had a small loading 
(.26661) for X42 (Debt per Case), consistent with the 
findings for Factor 9 (Debt per case). The highest loading 
variables on Factor 10 were CMI Adjusted LOS (Xll) and LOS 
(X100) with loadings of .83368 and .80880, respectively. It 
was notable that Length of Stay was one of the major factors 
explaining variation (2.7% of extracted variance) across 
hospitals. The importance of this factor to the subsequent 
discriminant analyses is addressed later in this chapter. 
With an eigenvalue of 1.70 and consistent loadings, this 
factor was considered a readily interpretable, as well as 
relatively important managerial decision related dimension. 
The fact that Short Term (91.8% of the Sample), Psychiatric 
(5.0% of the sample), and Long Term (1.4% of the Sample) Care 
facilities were included in the sample was a probable 
explanation of this dimension of observed variation in the 
data. In the discriminant analysis, the effects of Length of 
Stay were assessed net of the Type of Hospital factors and 
variables. Type of Hospital was found to rank higher in 
marginal discriminatory power than the Length of Stay factor. 
Factor 11 demonstrated that Maternity related variables 
represented an independent dimension of variation across 
hospitals in the sample. None of the high loading variables 
on this factor associated highly with the other service mix 
attributes (order S = -.01 on Factor 1). Percent Nursery 
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Costs and % Delivery Room and Labor Room Costs (loadings 
.81334 and .80835) were the two highest loading variables. 
This factor accounted for 2.2% of extracted variance, with a 
eigenvalue of 1.37. The interpretation "Maternity" was 
chosen as an obvious reflection of the nature of the high 
loading variables. 
The last of the major factors ( ^ > 1.0) was interpreted 
as Cost per Day, based on the highest loading variable (X28, 
Cost per Day, S = .920). The Cost per Case (X27) variable 
had a considerably lower loading (.51371). This may have 
been reflective of the finding in prior research (Berry [9], 
Feldstein and Shuttinga [22], and Bays [7]) that Cost per Day 
varies inversely with LOS, yielding an equivalent Cost per 
Case. The Paid Minus Nonpaid Workers per Census variable 
(X18) was the next highest loading variable (S = .39284), 
indicating the cost implications of staffing po licies--again 
a managerial decision variable. This factor accounted for 
1.8% of extracted variance, with an eigenvalue of 1.12. 
The remaining factors were considered minor factors due 
to eigenvalue magnitudes of less than one. Their percent of 
extracted variance ranged from 1.6% to 0.4% (16.8% cumulative 
total), with eigenvalues ranging from .99 to .23. 
Nonetheless, the variables loading on each of the minor 
factors represented further dimensions of variability which 
were of conceptual interest. 
The first minor factor of variation across hospitals in 
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the data sample was Factor 13 (Capital Intensity). The two 
highest loading variables were X36 (Assets per Case) and X27 
(Cost per Case) with loadings of .87801 and .59956, 
respectively. This factor was interpreted as reflecting 
Capital Intensity in that total Assets per Case was a measure 
of the investment made by the hospital management in capital 
assets for each patient case treated. The association of 
Cost per Case with this factor may have been attributable to 
the fact that costs are a function of assets consumed in the 
production of services (e.g., depreciation). The higher the 
capital investment, ceteras paribus, the higher certain costs 
will be. This factor may also have been considered as a weak 
proxy for the relative proportion of fixed costs (vs. 
variable costs) in the hospitals cost structure. The higher 
the capital intensity, presumably the higher the fixed costs 
and the lower the variable costs of operations. Although 
such a proxy effect may not necessarily hold for all cases, 
it has implications for attempting to observe 
cost/volume/profit relationships when analyzed in comparison 
to turnover measures. That is, a low fixed cost (low 
margin), high turnover operating strategy may be observed for 
some types of hospitals, while perhaps a high fixed cost 
(high margin), low turnover strategy may be observed for 
others. The importance of this factor to the subsequent 
discriminant analysis and research hypotheses is addressed 
later in this chapter. With an eigenvalue of 0.99, this 
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factor was very close to being classified as one of the major 
factors of variation. 
Factor 14 (Type of Hospital) was loaded most heavily 
(.66065) by variable X94 (Type of Hospital). Variable X40 
(Hospital Payment System Under Medicare) also associated with 
this factor (S = .50357), as might have been expected. This 
factor accounted for 1.5% of extracted variance, and was used 
as a means of partialing out effects attributable to e.g., 
Psychiatric, Specialty Long Term, etc., types of hospitals 
from the other measures used in the discriminant model. 
Factor 15 (SNF), Factor 26 (Intermediate Care), and 
Factor 28 (Other Long Term Care) were each interpreted as 
reflecting independent factors of variability attributable to 
the respective hospital/service types, in a fashion similar 
to Factor 14 (Type of Hospital). Also Factor 22 (Other 
Special Care), Factor 23 (ICU), Factor 24 (Speech Pathology), 
and Factor 30 (CCU) were interpreted as reflective of 
independent variation due to the respective services, similar 
to Factor 11 (Maternity). 
Other minor factors of interest were, first, Factor 16 
(Local Market Share). The % of County Admissions (X95) and % 
of County Net Patient Revenues (X96) variables measured the 
degree to which a given hospital serviced the demand for 
health care within its own county. Many counties may have 
only one hospital, but large urban centers may have several 
hospitals. This factor may, therefore, also have provided a 
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weak proxy effect for the urban/rural distinction found by 
Anderson and Steinberg [5] to be associated with quality of 
care (readmission rate). In fact, X73 (Accreditation) did 
load inversely (-.14948) on Factor 16, indicating that the 
higher the local market share (e.g., rural, one-hospital 
counties), the lower the incidence of being accredited (X73 = 
0 if nonaccredited , 1 if accredited). 
Factor 17 (Reimbursabi1ity) was interpreted as being 
reflective of the relative proportion of Medicare 
reimbursable to nonreimbursable costs incurred by a given 
hospital. The inverse relationship was evidenced by the 
respective loadings (.69332 for X86, % Total Hospital 
Reimbursable Costs After Stepdown Costs and -.60181 for X88, 
% All Nonreimbursable Cost Centers Costs). The relationship 
was also a potentially important managerial decision 
dimension and explained 1.3% of extracted variance. 
Factor 18 (System Affiliation) evidenced an inverse 
relationship between System Type (X19) and Means of System 
Affiliation (X71). Variable X71 was the AHA definition, 
while variable X87 (Management/Support Services Purchased) 
was the Medicare definition, which also loaded .39712 on the 
same factor. The inverse relationship indicated that the 
higher the System Type index, the lower the Affiliation index 
(e.g.. Investor Owned systems tended to have Owned 
facilities, while Catholic Church systems frequently had 
Sponsored hospitals). All independent hospitals were 
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arbitrarily assigned an X71 value of one (Owned). Further 
discussion of the relationship of variable X87 to X71 is 
presented later in this chapter. It is conceivable that this 
factor could have been acting as a proxy for the Type of 
Control group distinction, in that System Type implied a type 
of control (e.g., Investor Owned vs. Other NP). However, 
Investor Owned systems frequently contract managed both 
Voluntary NP hospitals and Governmental hospitals. 
Therefore, the proxy effect was imperfect, at best. The 
effects of this factor on the subsequent Discriminant 
Analysis are addressed later in this chapter. 
Factor 19 (Case Mix) evidenced considerable variability 
in the Medicare CMI (X8) across hospitals. It was notable, 
also, that Case Flow (X15) loaded equivalently high on the 
same factor. This suggested that the mix of patients treated 
by the hospital was related to the rate of flow of patients 
through the hospital. These were, again, potentially 
important managerial decision variables. 
Factor 20 (ROA) and Factor 27 (ROE) reflected variation 
across hospitals on the financial efficiency of capital 
investment. As noted previously, X33 (Asset Turnover) loaded 
lightly (-.18606) on Factor 20. In a theoretically similar 
vein, X23 (Adjusted Profit Margin) loaded (.49507) on Factor 
27, in the expected direction (i.e., the higher the profit 
margin, the higher the return on equity, ceteras paribus). 
Factor 21 (Patient Volume), as suggested by Sherman [37], 
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was also found to reflect variation across hospitals (0.9% of 
extracted variance). Adjusted Admissions (S = .51084) was 
interpreted as reflecting patient volume. 
Factor 25 (All Inclusive Rate) evidenced independent 
effects of a given hospital being an all inclusive rate 
provider. Kaiser Foundation hospitals, notably, were 
frequently all inclusive rate providers. It was also notable 
that X86 (% Total Reimbursable Hospital Costs After Stepdown 
Costs) also loaded, inversely, (-.34585) on this factor, 
indicating a weak relationship between reimbursability and 
all inclusive rate reimbursement. 
The final minor factor, Factor 29, was interpreted as 
reflective of financial liquidity. The single high loading 
variable was X38 (Current Ratio). This indicated that some 
(albeit only 0.5% of extracted variance) variation in current 
debt payment ability did exist across the sample hospitals. 
No known bankrupt hospitals were included in the sample. 
It should also be noted, specifically, the variables 
which did not load heavily on any of the extracted factors, 
thus implying their lack of variation in the data set, across 
the sample of hospitals. The low loading variables are 
presented in Table 12. 
Variable X98 loaded .49583 on Factor 22 (Other Special 
Care) and may be considered a marginally high loading 
variable, using an S >_ .50 criterion. Therefore, 75% of the 
raw data variables may be considered to be essentially 
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high-loading variables. Reviewing the low-loading variables, 
some departures from prior expectations were noteworthy. 
County Code (X16) was expected to associate either with 
location or quality measures. Its highest loading was 
-.16617 on Factor 23 (ICU), indicating perhaps a very weak 
association with quality, in as much as Accreditation (X73) 
also loaded (.27847) on Factor 23. Variable X18, Paid Minus 
Unpaid Workers per Census, was expected to vary, but its 
loadings were all of order .15 or less, except for a single 
loading of .39284 on Factor 12 (Cost per Day). During the 
data analysis, a number of substitutions of variables and 
definitions were tested to assess effects on loadings 
properties. The ratio of Nonpaid Workers FTEs/Average Daily 
Census was analyzed, but also did not load heavily. Variable 
X24 (Markup) had surprisingly low loadings, but both 
Ancillary Markup (X25) and Outpatient Markup (X26) loaded 
highly. This was consistent with Pattison and Katz’s [31] 
conclusion that perhaps "loss leader" pricing strategies were 
employed by some hospitals. According to the present 
analysis (which encompassed more than one type of hospital), 
no overall variation in total markup across the sample was 
evident. The absence of heavy loadings for Payor Mix (X29) 
was perhaps a sample specific attribute, since only Medicare 
certified providers were included. The lack of variation in 
Physicians’ Hours per Case (X32) was undoubtedly due to a 
high incidence of missing value cases found on this variable. 
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This did not permit support for arguments about quality 
differentials across hospitals (e.g., White [42]). The 
absence of variation in total Asset Turnover (X33) was 
unexpected, given the prior observation that FP system 
hospitals tended to have one half the number of beds of their 
NP counterparts (AHA [1]). However, both Plant Asset 
Turnover (X34) and Current Liability Turnover (X35) loaded 
heavily on Factor 7. This indicated that both the 
utilization of facilities and the speed of liability payments 
varied across the sample. But, as with Markup (X24), 
turnover did not vary on an overall basis. 
The low loadings for X39 (Debt Ratio) may have been 
attributable to the fact that nominal debt values were used, 
rather than market value based measures. However, Debt per 
Case (X42) did load heavily on Factor 9, which was classified 
as one of the major factors. The variable, % Donations 
(X43), was found not to vary, which was surprising due to the 
presumed lack of donations in FP hospitals. Percent 
Donations loaded exceptionally low on all factors. Perhaps 
this was attributable to the relative dollar amounts being of 
low materiality. 
Plant Asset Remaining Life (X44) did not load heavily, 
but was retained as a tenuous proxy for possible price level 
effects related to asset ages. Subject to its computational 
deficiencies, lack of variation in this variable across the 
sample tended to imply relatively non-differential general 
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price level effects. However, such interpretation was 
tenuous due to the possibility of asset revaluations upon 
hospital acquisition, differential depreciation methods, or 
differential useful life estimates. Fiscal Year End (X46) 
did not load heavily, which was supportive of the selected 
9/84 - 8/85 time period as containing all FYE months 
significantly similar to the sample as a whole, on various 
measures. Percent Investment Income (X47) did not vary, 
perhaps due to relative immateriality. 
Given the very high loadings on each of the common size 
service costs variables, it was notable that % Anesthesiology 
Costs (X61), % Radiology-Therapeutic Costs (X63), and % Blood 
Storing Costs (X68) did not load heavily on any of the 
factors. Variable X61 did load (-.28613) on Factor 14 (Type 
of Hospital), % Radiology-Therapeutic Costs loaded (.29117) 
on Factor 6 (Size), and X68 loaded (.39266) also on Factor 
6. Perhaps these three variables had slight, but systematic 
variation across certain classes of hospitals. Variable X66 
(% Funded Depreciation) also had very low loadings on all of 
the factors . 
Accreditation (X73) was not found to load heavily on any 
of the factors. It would have been expected to load together 
with X91 and X92 (% Medicare Malpractice Costs, and % 
Hospital Malpractice Insurance Premiums and/or Fund 
Contributions) as a proxy for the quality of care. To the 
extent that accreditation proxied for quality, it may be 
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considered to mildly support arguments of quality 
differences, in that it had loadings of .38267 on Factor 6 
(Size), -.16163 on Factor 8 (Location), -.10115 on Factor 15 
(SNF), -.14948 on Factor 16 (Local Market Share), and .27847 
on Factor 23 (ICU). 
Percent Electroencephalography (X77) loaded only very 
weakly (.17205) on Factor 6 (Size), indicating a very slight 
relationship. Variable X87 (Management/Support Services 
Purchased) was expected to load with Means of System 
Affiliation (X71), which did occur to a modest degree (.39712 
on Factor 18, System Affiliation). The nature of the 
non-identical Medicare and AHA measures (X87 and X71 
respectively) was evidenced by the size of the X87 loading. 
It was notable that the AHA variable (X71) loaded 
considerably higher on Factor 18 (perhaps due to its greater 
number of categoric levels) than the Medicare variable X87. 
Variable X90 (Interns and Residents Costs per Physician 
Hour) was included as a measure of both quality and degree of 
"service leverage." That is, the ratio of junior to senior 
personnel indicates the relative proportion of senior client 
load supported by junior staff. This may be presumed to have 
both economic and quality implications (i.e., the higher the 
ratio, the greater the economic benefits, but perhaps the 
lower the quality of service). This variable, however, did 
not load heavily on any of the factors, undoubtedly due to 
the high incidence of missing value cases for physician 
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hours. Number of Interns and Residents per Physician Hour 
and Cost per Intern and Resident were also tested (among 
other variable alternatives), but yielded similar results. 
Discriminant Analysis 
The discriminant analysis proceeded as follows: 
1. All thirty factors were used as predictor variables in 
the discrimination of the condensed set of nine Type of 
Cont rol groups . 
2. Only the first twelve major factors were used. 
3. Each of the thirty factors was conditionally deleted from 
the complete model to assess the respective marginal 
effects on classification efficacy of the model. 
4. The above three steps were repeated using the highest 
loading raw data variable on each of the respective 
thirty factors . 
5. Results of the factor analytic vs. the highest loading 
raw data variable models were compared. 
Table 13 summarizes the classification rates for each version 
of the discriminant model. Rotated canonical discriminant 
functions were used, and classification was done using within 
group covariance matrices of the canonical discriminant 
functions. Sample proportions were used as prior probability 
estimates. Only discriminant functions significant at at 
least the .10 level were used in classification. It should 
be noted that the group covariance matrices were found to be 
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significantly different in all (at the .000 level) cases 
(tested using Box’s M). 
Briefly noting the classification results, the best model 
was the factor analytic model, with Factor 26 deleted (52.47% 
correct classification). The factor analytic models 
outperformed the highest loading raw data variables models in 
all cases, except when using only the twelve major factors. 
Classification results and comparison to a naive sample 
proportions classification model are discussed in more detail 
in the latter part of this chapter. 
The canonical discriminant functions for the complete 
factor analytic model and the complete highest loading raw 
data variables model were extracted as presented in Table 
14. These two models will be used as representative of the 
set of sixty-three discriminant models, and will constitute 
the center of discussion for the remainder of this chapter. 
It should be noted that the first six significant 
functions for the factor analytic model accounted for 99.15% 
of extracted variance. The exceptionally high significance 
levels for both the complete factor analytic and complete 
highest loading raw data variables model versions must be 
interpreted with caution, however, as they were likely being 
driven by the large sample size. Function 7 in the complete 
factor analytic model was marginally close to meeting the .10 
significance level criterion for inclusion in the analysis, 
and in fact, the seventh function was significant at the .10 
level in the complete highest leading rav data variable!* 
version of the model. 
The conditional deletion approach (see Altaian et a 1 , [A]) 
was used to assess the relative, marginal significance of the 
individual predictor variables. Upon conditional deletion, 
the factor (or highest loading raw data variable) resulting 
in the greatest reduction in classification efficacy 
(relative to the respective complete model) was considered to 
be the predictor of ordinally greatest marginal 
discriminatory power. Each variable was successively deleted 
(with replacement) from its respective model, resulting in 
rank orderings for each of the factors and highest loading 
raw data variables as presented in Tables 15 and 16. 
It is notable that of the twelve major factors of 
variation across hospitals in the sample, only factors 3, 6, 
and 8 ranked among the twelve most discriminating variables. 
For the highest loading raw data variables version of the 
model, raw data variables representing factors 6, 8, 10, and 
11 ranked among the twelve most discriminating variables. In 
both versions of the model. System Affiliation (System Type) 
ranked highest as a predictor of group membership. This may 
have been attributable to the fact that NP systems tended to 
operate NP hospitals, although FP systems tended to operate 
both FP and NP hospitals. Size (Factor 6) was the second 
most discriminating variable (third for the raw data 
variables model). Debt per Case ranked very low as a 
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discriminator (16th and 14th respectively for the factor/raw 
data models). Patient Volume and Turnover ranked 10th and 
15th (3rd and 14th) respectively on the two models, 
indicating that Patient Volume was a more effective 
discriminator than investment turnover measures. 
Profitability per Case ranked 13th in both versions of the 
model, indicating a modest rank in discriminatory power. 
Although Service Mix ranked low (15th and 19th respectively), 
certain services represented on independent factors ranked 
quite high, e.g.. Speech Pathology, ICU, and CCU (7th, 8th, 
and 9th respectively for the factor analytic model). Length 
of Stay ranked comparatively low in effect (17th) when 
assessed relative to the entire set of factors, including 
Type of Hospital. Type of Hospital, on the other hand, 
ranked quite high (5th ) , indicating that Type of Hospital 
possessed greater marginal discriminatory power than LOS (on 
an ordinal scale). Case Mix ranked quite low (18th) along 
with the Ancillaries (14th), Cost per Day (16th), and 
Liquidity (20th) factors. Although this would appear to 
mitigate against arguments that such issues as cost, case 
mix, liquidity and emphasis on ancillary factors were 
relatively important distinctions between hospital control 
types, perhaps these factors contained information which was 
subsumed by other, more pervasive measures. In fact, the ten 
factors most strongly distinguishing hospital control types 
were those related to broad managerial policy choices, 
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encompassing System Affiliation, Size, Local Market Share, 
System Attributes, Type of Hospital, Location, Speech 
Pathology, ICU, CCU, and Patient Volume. In as much as 
Speech Pathology, ICU, and CCU represented certain services 
(independent of the basic Service Mix factor) which were 
important discriminators, it was evident that relative 
expenditure on a critical set of services varied 
systematically with managerial incentives, as proxied by the 
hospital Type of Control variable. The relative importance 
of Type of Hospital as a discriminator was consistent with 
this interpretation. Location, Local Market Share, and 
Patient Volume all, again, evidenced the variation of service 
volume in systematic relation to the managerial incentive 
structures. The relative importance of hospital Size as a 
discriminator was consistent with this second 
interpretation. System Affiliation and System Attributes 
were interpreted as representing the systematic variation 
; attributable to multihospital system organizational effects, 
as associated with differential managerial incentive 
structures. 
Within the context of Agency theory, these real valued 
service production and service volume related measures were 
found to differ significantly in association with managerial 
incentive structures, as proxied by the hospital Type of 
Control variable—thus permitting rejection of HQ1. The 
financing and investment related measures, such as Liquidity, 
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ROE, ROA, Debt per Case, Capital Intensity and Profitability 
per Case were found to be ordinally less important as 
discriminators than were the production related measures. 
Given that was rejected, consideration was given to 
Kq2• In as much as location and turnover measures were 
intended to depict volume effects, and Location, Local Market 
Share, and Patient Volume (as well as hospital Size) were all 
service volume related measures appearing among the ten most 
significant discriminators between hospital incentive groups, 
rejection of was also permitted. Again, the financial 
investment related Turnover factor was found to be ordinally 
less important as a discriminator than the service volume 
related measures. 
With regard to CVP related operating strategies, more 
detailed analysis of relative contribution margin rates must 
await specific estimation of relative fixed/variable cost 
behavior patterns across hospital groups before more 
definitive conclusions can be reached. It was nonetheless an 
important finding that service production and service volume 
related factors were observed to differ systematically with 
managerial incentive structures, as were multihospital system 
related factors. 
Considering the multihospital system factors, the 
specific raw data variables with high loadings on the System 
Affiliation and System Attributes factors were: 
System Affiliation: X19 System Type 
X71 Means of System Affiliation 
Sy s t em Att ribut es: XI Number of Facilities in System 
X2 Number of Beds in System 
X4 Number of Medicare Regions Spanned 
by System 
X5 Number of States Spanned by System 
X6 Number of Counties Spanned by 
System 
The System Affiliation measures both tended to depict 
organizational dimensions (e.g., Investor Owned-Contract 
Managed, Other Church-Owned, Independent-Owned, or Catholic 
Church-Sponsored) which also had financial implications. The 
System Attributes measures all tended to depict the size of 
the multihospital system (independent hospitals had scores of 
one for each of variables XI, X4, X5, and X6). Therefore, 
the size and organizational structure of multihospital 
systems were found to differ systematically with managerial 
incentives. In as much as size of the multihospital system 
may have had a dual identity effect (i.e., as a managerial 
decision variable and as a proxy for the existence of 
differential political costs) interpretation of the 
association of this dimension with incentive groups was 
limited . 
As mentioned previously, the organization structure 
measures may have partially proxied for the hospital Type of 
Control measure. Again, however, FP multihospital systems 
managed both Voluntary and Governmental NP hospitals, as well 
as FP hospitals. This dimension accounted for 6.9% ((52.45 - 
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48.84) / 54.45) of the classification efficacy of the factor 
analytic discriminant model, and 10.6% ((48.11 - 43.02) / 
48.11) of the classification efficacy of the highest loading 
raw data variables model. Therefore, the System Type 
variable was not identical to the Type of Control grouping 
variable. The important observation was that each of the 
service production, service volume, and multihospital system 
related factors had significant independent association with 
the hospital Type of Control variable, net of the effects of 
all other predictor variables. 
Examining the actual complete factor analytic 
discriminant model group centroids, (see Table 17), it should 
be noted that all of the centroids were close together except 
for Group 10 (Governmental, Hospital District) on the first 
function. Group 9 (Governmental, State) on the second and 
third functions. Group 4 (Proprietary, Corporation) on the 
third function. Group 3 & 5 (Proprietary, Individual and 
Proprietary, Partnership) on the second and third functions, 
and Group 1 (Voluntary NP, Church) on the fourth function. 
This indicated that these five groups (i.e., 1, 4, 3 & 5, 9, 
and 10) were those which were most distinguishable from the 
remaining hospitals. In the complete highest loading raw 
data variables version of the discriminant model, the most 
distinguishable groups were, Group 1 on the first function, 
Group 10 on the second, fifth and sixth functions. Group 3 & 
5 on the third function, Group 4 on the third function, and 
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Group 9 on the fourth functions (i.e., the same set of five 
groups). 
The classification efficacy of the models was also quite 
strong. The order 50% classification accuracy must be 
evaluated in comparison to a next best model, such as a 
naive, equal priors (1/9) model, or a sample proportions 
model. Actual classification results for the complete factor 
analytic and complete highest loading raw data variables 
models are presented in Table 18. 
Comparison of the classification results to a sample 
proportions model indicated that the two versions of the 
discriminant model represented a 280% and 160% average 
improvement, respectively, over the sample proportions 
model 
Analysis of the classification results for the complete 
factor analytic discriminant model indicated that the 
greatest degree of classification improvement occurred in 
Groups 1, A, 9, 10, and 11, which was generally consistent 
with the group centroid evidence discussed previously. The 
discriminant model performed poorly for Groups 3 & 5 and 7 & 
8. This may have been due to the arbitrary combinations made 
in forming these two groups. However, the most frequent 
misclassification (58.3%) of Group 3 & 5 member hospitals was 
assignment to Group A. This suggested that Proprietary 
Individual and Proprietary Partnership hospitals were highly 
similar to Proprietary Corporation hospitals within the 
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studied data set. The most frequent misclassification 
(46.4%) of Group 7 & 8 member hospitals was assignment to 
Group 2. This suggested that Governmental, City-County and 
Governmental, County hospitals were highly similar to 
Voluntary NP , Other hospitals within the context of this 
study . 
The classification results and separation pattern of 
group centroids strongly indicated that differences between 
managerial incentive structures, as proxied by the Type of 
Control measure, were systematically related to operating 
performance measures—particularly distinguishing Voluntary 
NP, Church; Proprietary; Governmental, State; and 
Governmental, Hospital District hospitals. Governmental, 
Hospital District hospitals tended to have consistently 
outlying values on nearly all of the highest loading raw data 
measures, as discussed below. 
In terms of specific managerial decision variables, the 
results of the analysis suggested that hospital management, 
operating under different incentive structures, organized, 
produced, and provided health care services in systematically 
different ways. The specific mean and standard deviation 
statistics for each of the fundamental highest loading raw 
data variables, and for each of the underlying factor scores, 
are presented in Tables 19 and 20, respectively. 
Some notable observations can be made by analyzing the 
highest loading raw data variables by group (see Table 19). 
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First, X48 (% Adults and Pediatrics (General Routine Care) 
Costs) was slightly higher for FP hospitals, on average, 
than for the Voluntary NP, Other group, and distinguished 
Group 1 (Voluntary NP , Church) from all other groups with 
what (judging by the relatively large standard deviation) may 
have been spuriously affected values. The unusually high 
value for variable X92 (% Hospital Malpractice Insurance 
Premiums) for Group 10 (Governmental, Hospital District) may 
possibly have been due to structural attributes specific to 
Hospital District hospitals, or may have been due to spurious 
data values. The consistency of outlier values for this 
group, however, made interpretation difficult. Otherwise, no 
appreciable variation existed on variable X92. Profit per 
Case (X22) differed markedly by Type of Control. The typical 
Profit per Case group mean value was in the order of $250.00, 
except for Group 3 & 5 and Group 10. Proprietary Individual 
and Partnership hospitals had considerably higher average 
Profit per Case ($774.00) while Governmental, Hospital 
District hospitals lost $5,473.00 per case (with very large 
standard deviation) during the sample period. Also, XI 
(Number of Facilities in System) varied markedly by group. 
Group 10 hospitals tended to be independent hospitals, Church 
related hospitals had an average of 7.8 facilities per 
system. Proprietary Individual and Partnership hospitals had 
the highest average number of facilities (99.4 hospitals per 
system). Variable X10 (Occupancy Rate) differed most between 
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Group 10 (20.8%) and Group 1 (45.6%). The notable finding 
was that the highest average occupancy rate was less than 
50%, with an average across all groups of 44%. This 
indicated existence of vast overcapacity in the hospital 
industry taken as a whole. Governmental, Hospital District 
hospitals were on average nearly 80% unoccupied and, 
according to the data set, were losing over $5,400.00 per 
case. Considering the fact that average occupancy rates 
varied as much as 29% across the hospital groups, a policy 
implication would be to provide financial reimbursement 
incentives to hospitals reducing excess capacity, perhaps 
through conversion to other uses, such as e.g., nursing home 
care. 
Variable X13 (Adjusted Admissions) also varied markedly 
across groups. Church related and Other NP hospitals had the 
highest admissions 9,617 and 7,302 respectively) while 
Governmental hospitals tended to have the lowest (order 
3,600), except for Governmental, City-County and 
Governmental, County hospitals which had average admissions 
of 5,150. The FP hospitals had approximately one half the 
admissions of the Voluntary NP hospitals (4,064 for 
Proprietary, Corporations and 5,047 for Proprietary, 
Individual and Partnership hospitals. This finding was 
consistent with the observation that FP system hospitals had, 
on average, one-half the number of beds of their NP 
counterparts (AHA [1]). Plant Asset Turnover (X34) was again 
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highly disproportionate for Hospital District hospitals. 
Otherwise, both Church related and FP Corporation hospitals 
each had, on average, two to three times higher turnover 
rates than other hospitals (order 7 times per year, as 
compared to order 2 to 3 times per year). This finding, 
again, had policy implications, in that Plant Asset Turnover 
is a managerial decision related variable. It is also 
noteworthy that both Church related NP and Corporate FP 
hospitals had similar, distinctively high plant asset 
utilization rates, as measured by turnover. 
Medicare region, X3, was a categoric variable. 
Therefore, mean values were not subject to meaningful 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the most common mean value was 
near Region 5 (Chicago). With a standard deviation of 
approximately two, this implied a range of distribution from 
Region 3 to 7, which would include any of the Philadelphia 
(3), Atlanta (A), Chicago (5), Dallas (6), and Kansas City 
(7) regions. The Voluntary NP, Other hospitals had the 
lowest mean value for X3 (A.8) while Governmental, City 
hospitals had the highest (6.8). Variable XA2 (Debt per 
case) varied considerably across groups. Individual and 
Partnership Proprietary hospitals had the highest Debt per 
Case ($2,118.00) and both the Governmental, City-County and 
County, and Governmental, State hospitals had the lowest 
($857.00 and $81A.00, respectively) Debt per Case. In 
general, Governmental hospitals had approximately one third 
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less debt per case than private hospitals, with Voluntary NP 
hospitals being more highly leveraged than Proprietary 
Corporations, but less highly leveraged than Proprietary 
Individual and Partnership controlled hospitals. The 
Governmental hospitals perhaps received intragovernmental 
transfers which may have accounted for the difference in 
their debt capitalization. 
Variable Xll (CMI Adjusted LOS) was highest for the 
Hospital District hospitals (17.46 days) and lowest in the 
Governmental, Federal and Governmental, Other group (6.35 
days). Among the private hospitals, the FP groups averaged 
approximately 2.4 days shorter CMI Adjusted LOS than the 
NPs. The finding of shorter CMI Adjusted LOS in FP hospitals 
was consistent with prior research (Berry [9] and Feldstein 
and Shuttinga [22]). Given that this measure was adjusted 
for case mix differences, the implication was that unless 
Voluntary NPs on average treated more severe cases of patient 
illness, the FPs were simply discharging patients more 
quickly. The clinical and quality implications of this 
finding are beyond the scope of this study. 
Percent Nursery Costs (X54) was lowest in Hospital 
District hospitals and highest in the City-County and County 
Governmental hospital group. Proprietary Corporations had 
the second lowest relative expenditure on nursery costs 
compared to all other hospital groups. Among private 
hospitals, NPs spent relatively more than FPs on nursery 
82 
costs. Whether this finding reflected differences in cost 
efficiency or simply different levels of provision of nursery 
services was indeterminate from the data set. 
Cost per Day (X28) differed considerably across the 
incentive groups. Hospital District hospitals incurred an 
average of $1,952.00 per day, while State hospitals incurred 
$365.00 per day, on average. Church related NPs and 
Corporate FPs incurred about the same Cost per day ($430.00 
and $432.00 respectively). Voluntary NP, Other hospitals 
incurred $387.00 Cost per Day, while FP Individual and 
Partnership hospitals incurred $475.00 per day. This finding 
was consistent with, and presented additional detail to a 
prior research finding (Berry [9]) of higher Cost per Day in 
FPs than NPs (Watt et al. [33], however, had found no 
difference). Among the private hospitals, the Voluntary NP, 
Other group incurred the lowest Cost per Day, which was the 
third lowest among all hospitals. Capital Intensity, as 
proxied by the measure. Assets per Case (X36), was highest in 
Hospital District hospitals ($17,840.00 per case) and lowest 
in the Governmental, Federal and Governmental, Other group 
($2,403.00). Proprietary hospitals had an average of $470.00 
lower asset investment per case than Voluntary NP hospitals. 
Voluntary NP , Other hospitals had the highest Capital 
Intensity among private hospitals ($4,077.00), FP 
Corporations had the lowest ($3,122.00, nearly $1,000.00 less 
per case than the Voluntary NP, Other group). 
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The Type of Hospital categoric variable (X94) averaged 
closest to Specialty Long Term for Hospital District 
hospitals, and closest to General Long Term (2.08) for 
Proprietary Corporations. All other groups averaged closest 
to the General Short Term or General Long Term hospital 
types. This variable perhaps explained the consistent 
finding of outlier values on other measures for the Hospital 
District hospital group. The standard deviation for this 
variable was 2.3 for Corporate FP hospitals, indicating a 
range from 1 to 4.4 on the Type of Hospital categoric 
variable. This range would include any of General Short 
Term, General Long Term, Tuberculosis, and Speciality Long 
Term hospitals. Again, however, interpretation of mean 
values for categoric variables was not a reliable form of 
analysis . 
Percent SNF Costs (X55) was highest for the Governmental, 
City-County and County group, and lowest for Proprietary 
Corporations. Among private hospitals, NPs spent a nearly 
three times greater proportion on SNFs than FPs. 
Local Market Share, as measured by % of County Admissions 
(X95) varied across groups, with Voluntary NPs averaging 38 
to 41% and FPs averaging 21 to 28%. State hospitals averaged 
highest in Local Market Share, serving 80.7% of County 
Admissions. Hospital District hospitals had the smallest 
local market share of all groups (15.6%). The average across 
all groups was 44%, indicating the existence of slightly more 
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than two hospitals serving each county, on average. The fact 
that FP hospitals tended to serve a relatively low percentage 
of county admissions indicated that they tended to locate in 
areas served by more than one hospital. This variable may 
therefore have been proxying for an urban/rural distinction. 
It was noteworthy that although e.g., State hospitals served 
over 80% of total admissions in their local county, they were 
nearly 59% unoccupied. 
Percent Total Hospital Reimbursable Costs after Stepdown 
Costs (X86) did not differ sharply across groups, but was 
lowest for Hospital District hospitals (86%). The average 
for this variable was 96.9% across all groups. The FP 
hospitals had a slightly higher (order + 1.5%) average 
reimbursabi1ity measure than Voluntary NPs. 
System Type (X19) categories (again of tenuous 
interpretability for mean values) were generally skewed 
(toward category 5) by the high frequency of independent 
hospitals (systems of one). The first group, Voluntary NP, 
Church seemed to be least affected by the incidence of 
independent hospitals, with an average value between System 
Type categories 1 and 2 (Catholic Church and Other Church). 
Case Flow (X15) differed markedly across groups, with 
Hospital District hospitals having the lowest Case Flow (13.7 
CMI adjusted cases per year per bed), and Church related 
hospitals having the highest (41.3 CMI adjusted cases per 
year per bed). Among private hospitals, FPs had lower case 
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flow than NP s , which was consistent with the lower occupancy 
rate in FPs, but was not suggestive of a high patient volume 
strategy among FPs. 
Variable X20 (Adjusted Return on Assets) displayed 
radically different average values across groups. Some of 
the very large negative values may have been attributable to 
the subtraction of Medicare return on equity payments from 
Net Income (or Loss) in the numerator of the ratio, or due to 
a spurious small denominator problem. Again, Hospital 
District hospitals had an abnormally large negative value for 
ROA, but Individual and Partnership Proprietaries had the 
most extreme negative value. Given that variable X21 
(Adjusted Return on Equity) had much less extreme values and 
differed in ratio definition only in the denominator, while 
all but one hospital group had positive Profit per Case 
(X22), and all groups had positive Assets per Case (X36), the 
ROA values were most likely affected by spurious data 
values. Upon conditional deletion from the discriminant 
model, both ROA and ROE ranked relatively low in 
discriminatory power, and therefore the spurious ROA values 
were of relatively small effect on the model. As mentioned 
previously, any otherwise existing potential of ROA as a 
discriminator may have been obscured. Nonetheless, 
Proprietary, Corporation hospitals earned A.75% ROA, and the 
remaining Governmental hospitals earned from 5.3% to 19.9% 
ROA (noting that Adjusted Return on Assets was computed with 
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Medicare return on equity subtracted from the numerator of 
the ratio). 
Variable X51 (% All Other Special Care Units Cost) was 
highest for Hospital District hospitals (10.2%). Among 
private hospitals, FPs had relative expenditure slightly less 
than NPs. But again, the common size measures did not 
distinguish between cost efficiency and differential levels 
of service production. 
Percent ICU Days (X99) was approximately 1% lower for 
Governmental hospitals than for private hospitals, on 
average. Among private hospitals, FPs average slightly 
higher than NPs. Since this variable ranked highly as a 
discriminator, it was noteworthy that it differed more 
between Governmental and private hospitals than between FP/NP 
private hospitals. The difference between FP and 
Governmental hospitals averaged 1.8% (FPs having the higher 
values for % ICU Days). It appeared, then, that a relatively 
greater proportion of ICU days was a distinguishing attribute 
of private hospitals, and most notably, of FP hospitals. 
Percent Speech Pathology Costs (X75) was quite low for 
all groups (order 0.15% or less), but was highest in Hospital 
District and Voluntary NP hospitals. The FP hospitals had 
values approximately one half that of the Voluntary NPs. 
Variable X93 (All Inclusive Rate Provider) had an average 
categoric mean value close to zero (No) for all groups, but 
was highest for Hospital District hospitals. The average 
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value was higher for FP Corporations than for Voluntary NP s , 
but was lowest across all groups for Individual and 
Partnership hospitals. Again, interpretation of mean values 
for the categoric variables was tenuous. 
Percent Intermediate Care Facility Costs (X56) was more 
than approximately twice as high for Voluntary NPs than for 
FPs on average, but was highest for Hospital District 
hospitals . 
Adjusted Return on Equity (X21) had marked variation 
across groups. The lowest positive Adjusted ROE value was 
for Governmental, Federal and Governmental, Other hospitals 
(2.8%) and highest for NP Church related hospitals (142%). 
Again, the appearance of large negative values (e.g., -806% 
for FP Corporations) was likely the consequence of spurious 
data values, although it could have been partly attributable 
to the subtraction of Medicare return on equity from the 
numerator value in the ratio. Again, relative discriminatory 
power for this variable was found to rank low upon 
conditional deletion from the model. 
Percent Other Long Term Care Facilities Cost (X57) varied 
markedly across groups. Hospital District hospitals had the 
highest percentage (2.9%) while FP Individual and Partnership 
hospitals had the lowest average percent (0%). The FP 
hospitals, on average, had an approximately eight times lower 
relative expenditure on this service than voluntary NPs. 
Liquidity, as measured by the Current Ratio (X38), was 
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highest for State hospitals (120.9 : 1, perhaps due to 
intragovernmenta 1 administration of current liabilities), and 
lowest for Hospital District hospitals (-3.78 : 1). The FP 
Corporations had the highest Current Ratio among private 
hospitals (2.8 : 1), and FP Individual and Partnership 
hospitals had the lowest (2.3 : 1) among private hospitals. 
Percent CCU Days (X97) averaged more than twice as high 
for Voluntary NPs than for FPs. Private hospitals also 
averaged approximately 50% higher than Governmental hospitals 
on this variable. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
Limltat ions 
This study encompassed both the population of 
multihospital systems and nonsystem hospitals within a 
limited time frame. The assessment of relative importance of 
predictor variables in the discriminant functions was limited 
to assessing relative marginal significance, rather than 
absolute significance, and the assumption of normality was 
violated by the use of categoric variables. 
The use of Medicare CMI was a limiting factor in that it 
was not reflective of the case mix of non-Medicare patients. 
However, Becker and Steinwald [8] cite findings by Watts and 
Klastorin that the CPHA, all patient based RNI correlated 97% 
with the New Jersey DRG (diagnostic) based CMI. The Medicare 
CMI is similar in design to the New Jersey index and 
therefore was used as a tentative proxy for overall case mix. 
Given that the HCRIS data base was new, there was also 
the potential for reduced power of the statistical tests due 
to data errors. Some areas of coding error surfaced, 
although they were found to notably affect only two variables 
out of 100, both of which provided relatively small 
contribution to the efficacy of the discriminant model. 
Also, certain hospitals (e.g., Shriners Hospitals for 
Crippled Children) were presumably not Medicare certified 
(although some may be Medicaid certified) and were therefore 
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not included in the HCRIS file. This data base, however, 
constituted a significant improvement over former data 
paucity problems. Nonetheless, capital-market based measures 
of cost of equity and debt on an individual hospital basis 
were not available. Notably, a measure of the market value 
of equity for NPs does not exist. Also, the impact of 
financing leases, long-term executory contracts or unfunded 
pension liabilities on debt measures was indeterminate due to 
data limitations. Consequently, the related book value based 
operating and financial performance measures must be regarded 
as tentative proxies. 
Quality of care was weakly proxied in the proposed study, 
using structural variables. Until more reliable measures of 
process or outcome quality are developed and become publicly 
available, controls for quality differences among hospitals 
will remain a limiting factor in health care oriented 
research, and the results must be interpreted accordingly. 
Of course, all of the caveats of factor analysis apply to 
the proposed study, such as the sample specific sensitivity 
of the factors, data distributional assumptions, factor 
interpretabi1ity problems, and the question of the 
appropriateness of the use of orthogonal rather than oblique 
rotation. 
Furthermore, no attempt was made in the study to assess 
relative technical efficiency of hospital performance. Such 
assessment requires unequivocal definition of what 
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constitutes hospital inputs and outputs. Such definition and 
analysis was beyond the scope of this study. 
Given that the study was within the economic context of 
the first year of PPS, any departures from the conclusions of 
prior research may have been attributable to the improved 
methodology, a first year PPS effect, or some combination of 
the two effects. The effects of a PPS type arrangement have 
been predicted to reduce certain areas of difference between 
FP/NP hospital performance through competitive pressures 
(Conrad [13], also implied by the Renn et al. [33] 
analysis). Although PPS reimbursement constituted only 25% 
of Medicare reimbursement for the period under study, it may 
have tended to bias the data against the finding of 
significant FP/NP performance differences. Therefore, the 
use of PPS data may have provided a stronger test of the 
existence of differences than pre-PPS data. In combination 
with the improved statistical methodology, the finding of 
significant differences within the PPS data set may, 
therefore, be a more significant finding than pre-PPS 
research efforts have been able to document. 
Data limitations on taxes and age of asset prices 
existed, as discussed in the previous chapters. Indirect 
proxies of both items were available, but the problematic 
nature of appropriate tax adjustments, and asset 
revaluations, rendered both classes of effects tenuous. 
Consequently, the research results must be qualified subject 
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to these issues . 
Reliance on audit status as a proxy for degree of 
accounting compliance with HCFA reporting standards may not 
have been a sufficient control for any intervening accounting 
methodology effects on the data measures. Also, variations 
in the consistency of design and/or effectiveness of 
hospita1-specific incentive programs within each of the nine 
condensed incentive groups may have confounded the 
association of incentives and performance measures. 
Finally, the lack of specific bond covenant attributes 
and limits, and the confounding dual identification (proxy) 
role of size and debt measures provided weak control for the 
effects of alternative economic factors. 
Conclusions 
The analysis resulted in rejection of (Financial 
and operating performance variables do not discriminate 
between FP/NP hospitals, after controlling for the 
intercorre lation structure among the variables). The results 
also permitted rejection of (Location and turnover 
measures do not have relatively greater discriminatory power 
than other performance variables found to discriminate 
between FP/NP hospitals). With regard to the hypotheses, the 
service production, service volume, and multihospital system 
size and organizational related factors distinguished the 
hospital incentive groups more effectively than specific 
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financial measures. This finding has implications both for 
the availability and distribution of certain types of care 
across hospital incentive (control) groups. 
The factor analysis reduced the data set of 100 variables 
to twelve major factors (eigenvalues 1) and eighteen minor 
factors (eigenvalues < 1) of variation among hospitals in the 
sample. The twelve major factors were interpreted as: 
1. S ervice Mix 
2. Ancillaries 
3. System Attributes 
4. Profitability per Case 
5. 0 ccupancy 
6 . Size 
7 . Turnover 
8. Location 
9. Debt per Case 
10. LOS 
11. Mat e rnity 
12. Cost per Day 
Not all of the major factors had the relatively greatest 
discriminatory power in distinguishing between hospital Type 
of Control groups. The highest loading raw data variables 
having the first twelve ranks of relatively greatest 
discriminatory power were (with associated factors in 
pa renthes es): 
1. System Type (18) 
2. % of County Admissions (16) 
3. Adjusted Admissions (6, 21) 
4. % ICU Bed Days (23) 
5. Medicare Region (8) 
6. % Intermediate Care Facility Costs (26) 
7. % Nursery Costs (11) 
8. Case Flow (19) 
9. All Inclusive Rate Provider (25) 
10. CMI Adjusted LOS, % Other Long Term Care Facility 
Costs (10, 28) 
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11. % Total Hospital Reimbursable Costs After Stepdown 
Costs (17) 
12. % Speech Pathology Costs (24) 
The groups most readily distinguishable from all other groups 
were: 
1. Voluntary NP, Church 
4. Proprietary, Corporation 
3 & 5. Proprietary, Individual and Proprietary, 
Partnership 
9. Governmental, State 
10. Governmental, Hospital District 
The average FP hospital differed from the average 
Voluntary NP hospital in the following ways. FPs had: 
1. Lower % Adult and Pediatrics (General Routine Care) 
Costs . 
2. Equivalent % Hospital Malpractice Insurance 
P remiums . 
3. Nine times more facilities in systems. 
4. As much Profit per Case (Corporations) or more 
Profit per Case (Individual and Partnership 
hospitals) . 
5. Slightly lower Occupancy Rates. 
6. One half the Adjusted Admissions. 
7. Equivalent Plant Asset Turnover. 
8. A tendency to locate slightly more frequently toward 
the Dallas region rather than the Chicago or Atlanta 
region (based on categoric means). 
9. Lower Debt per Case for Corporations, higher for 
Individual and Partnership hospitals. 
10. Lower CMI Adjusted LOS. 
11. Lower % Nursery Costs. 
12. Higher Cost per Day (for Individual and Partnership 
hospitals), equivalent for Corporation and NP Church 
related hospitals. 
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13. Lower Assets per Case. 
14* A tendency to operate General Long Term hospitals 
more frequently (based on categoric means). 
15. Lower % SNF Costs. 
16. An average of 15% lower Local Market Share (% of 
County Admissions). 
17. Slightly higher reimbursability (% Total Hospital 
Reimbursable Costs After Stepdown Costs). 
18. Lower Case Flow. 
19. Lower % All Other Special Care Units Costs. 
20. Higher % ICU Bed Days. 
21. One half the % Speech Pathology Costs. 
22. A tendency toward greater frequency of All Inclusive 
Rate Provider status for Corporations, a lesser 
frequency for Individual and Partnership hospitals. 
23. Lower % Intermediate Care Facility Costs. 
24. Eight times less % Other Long Term Care Facility 
Costs . 
25. Higher Current Ratio for Corporations, lower for 
Individual and Partnership hospitals. 
26. Lower % CCU Bed Days. 
The three major areas of FP/NP hospital differences 
(i.e., service production, service volume, and multihospital 
system related factors) may be used to organize a profile of 
the attributes of the respective FP/Voluntary NP hospital 
types . 
Concerning service production differentials, FP hospitals 
tended to have a slightly greater percentage of total 
facility bed days devoted to ICU care, and a lesser 
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percentage devoted to CCU care, than Voluntary NP hospitals. 
The FPs incurred approximately one half the relative Speech 
Pathology costs of Voluntary NPs, and had a categoric mean 
tendency toward the General Long Term hospital type. This 
observed service production profile implies that health care 
industry regulators may consider the desirability, ceteras 
paribus, of encouraging FP hospital operation in regions 
where ICU services are in short supply, or alternatively, 
discouraging FP hospital operation in regions where CCU 
services are considered to be of primary need. Encouragement 
of Voluntary NP hospital operation would appear to be the 
preferred policy, in such alternative regions. Of course, 
the reasons why the observed FP/NP service production 
differentials existed on these specific services, as opposed 
to other services, would need to be investigated before such 
implications may be formulated into specific policy 
r e c o mm endations. 
With regard to service volume, FP hospitals had 
approximately 15% lower proportionate share of County 
Admissions than Voluntary NP hospitals. The FPs also had a 
categoric mean tendency to locate toward the Dallas region 
(as opposed to the Chicago or Atlanta regions). This 
observed service volume related profile implies that health 
care industry regulators may consider the desirability, 
ceteras paribus, of encouraging FP hospital operation in 
regions where the small, non-market dominating hospital would 
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fill a perceived capacity need. Again, the reasons why the 
observed FP/NP service volume differentials existed in this 
particular pattern, as opposed to some other pattern, would 
need to be investigated before such implications may be 
formulated into specific policy recommendations. 
Concerning multihospital system related factors, FP 
hospitals had approximately nine times greater Number of 
Facilities in System than Voluntary NP hospitals, and had a 
categoric mean tendency toward the Investor Owned system type 
(the System Type variable was not identical to the hospital 
Type of Control variable). This observed multihospital 
system related profile, in and of itself, would not seem to 
imply any particular desirability differential with respect 
to health care industry regulatory policy. It is notable, 
however, that there were no AHA registered multihospital 
system affiliated hospitals in the State of Rhode Island [1], 
and in fact, Rhode Island had no AHA registered FP hospitals 
at all [2] . It is also notable that although NP hospitals 
(both Voluntary and Governmental) were frequently affiliated 
with Investor Owned systems (213 cases in the sample, i.e., 
32% of FP system affiliates), the reverse situation was 
rarely found (29 cases, i.e., 3% of NP system affiliates) in 
the data set. That is, FP hospitals were rarely found to be 
affiliated with NP multihospital systems (although a small 
number were represented on each of the NP system types). One 
plausible explanation for this finding is that although FP 
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organizations may support an NP endeavor, an NP system might 
jeopardize its tax exempt status if it engaged in significant 
FP operations. Alternatively, NP managerial decisions at the 
system level may simply be inconsistent with the profit 
incentive on the individual hospital level. The reasons why 
the observed FP/NP multihospital system related differences 
existed in these particular patterns, as opposed to 
alternative patterns, would, again, need to be investigated 
before their implications and relevance to health care 
regulatory policy may be assessed. 
It is also of tangental interest to note the average 
values across all hospitals for a given patient. The average 
patient: 
1. Generated $44.98 profit for the hospital. 
2. Visited a hospital that was 56% unoccupied. 
3. Was treated in the Chicago region. 
4. Was financed by $1,659.28 in debt. 
5. Stayed 8.5 days. 
6. Incurred $464.54 per day in hospital costs 
($3,948.59 cost for an 8.5 day stay). 
7. Was supported by $4,012.61 in asset investment. 
8. Visited a General hospital. 
In general, the results of this study were quite 
pronounced. That is, the factor analysis produced a highly 
polarized, relatively easily interpretable set of factors, 
which reduced the data set by 70%. The discriminant analysis 
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produced six to seven significant functions, with a maximum 
of 284% improvement (see Endnote 1) in classification 
accuracy over a sample proportions model. The results 
permitted rejection of both hypotheses, and provided insights 
concerning the relative importance of operating as opposed to 
financial performance dimensions. 
The reduction of the data set to common underlying 
factors was an improvement over previous research, which has 
substantially neglected the correlation structure of the 
data. Also, direct assessment of the marginal relative 
discriminatory power of the financial and operating 
performance variables was made within a multivariate 
framework. The assessment of significance of the association 
of specific performance variables with hospital incentive 
groups provided direction in identifying dimensions of 
managerial control which distinguished FP/NP hospital 
performance. Such direction is useful to both researchers 
and regulators in the analysis of the relative merits of the 
FP/NP organization types--*notably the association of the 
profit incentive with service production and service volume 
differentials. Such assessments of relative merit are 
important to decisions regarding certificate-of-need issues 
in the expansion of new hospital investment by FP/NP 
organizations. They are also important to the integrally 
related issue of potential redistributions of the 
availability of quality care, in as much as location 
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differences were found to be significantly related to 
incentive type. As Neumann [30] has pointed out, perhaps 
policy makers responsible for adjustment of reimbursement 
programs could establish benchmark standards for the decision 
variables identified, and reward individual hospitals whose 
performance moved closer to those standards over time. Thus, 
the results offered by this study are suggestive of the kind 
of tools that would be useful as instruments of public policy 
(e.g., in reduction of hospital overcapacity). 
This study was also conducted within the economic context 
of the first year of the Medicare PPS program. The 
introduction of "flat rate" reimbursement into the hospital 
industry on a national basis was a notable public policy 
based alteration of the industry’s economic parameters. Any 
first year effects of the policy change were potentially 
reflected in the comparative performance results observed in 
the study, subject to the limitations previously described. 
Future Directions 
Future research directions in this area would include: 
1. Stronger controls for the quality, bond covenant, and 
political cost constructs, as finer more specific data 
become available. 
2. Observation of changes in performance measures in 
association with changes in type of ownership control 
101 
over time, as data become available. 
3. Cross sectional estimation of variable/fixed cost 
behavior in relation to patient volume, for finer 
analysis of possible differences in CVP related operating 
strategies across groups. 
4. Estimation of relative technical efficiency for specific 
costs for cross group comparison. 
5. Association of the degree of audit attention, with 
adjustment in reported net income, or other 
incentive-signa11ing related variables. 
6. Hospital specific adjustments for tax effects, inflation 
effects, urban/rural differences, market value of debt 
and equity, and variations in accounting methodology as 
finer, more specific data become available. 
7. Investigation of why specific incentive structure 
differences are associated with the particular 
performance difference patterns observed, as opposed to 
alternative patterns. 
ENDNOTES 
Chapter IV 
^ Computed as follows: 
Complete Factor Analytic Discriminant Model: 
[(41.7 - 13.197)/13.197 + (72.5 - 41.988)/41.988 + (49.8 - 
12.261)/12.261 + (1.2 - 3.145)/3.145 + (0 - 2.827)/2.827 + 
(51.4 - 11.700)/ll.700 + (63.0 - 3.950)/3.950 + (24.1 - 
7 .057)/7 .057 + (4.3 - 3 . 875)/3 . 875]/9 = ( 2 .159 + .727 + 3.062 
- .618 - 1.00 + 3.393 + 14.949 + 2.415 + .110)/9 = 25.197/9 = 
2.8 
(The analogous computation for the best factor analytic 
model, i.e, the complete model with Factor 26 deleted, 
yielded an average improvement in classification accuracy of 
284%.) 
Complete Highest Loading Raw Data Variables Discriminant 
Model: 
[( 65.0 - 13 .197)/13 .197 + ( 60.0 - 41 .988)/41 .988 + ( 33 .7 - 
12.261)/12.261 + (1.2 - 3.145)/3.145 + (1.3 - 2.827)/2.827 + 
(53.6 - 11.700)/11 .700 + (46 .4 - 3.950)/3.950 + (23.6 - 
7 .057)/7 .057 + (9 .2 - 3 . 875 )/3 .875 ]/9 = (3 .925 + .429 + 1 .749 
- .618 - .540 + 3.581 + 10.747 + 2.344 + 1.374)/9 = 14.465/9 
= 1.6 
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Table 1 
Medicare Regions with Sample Proportions^- 
Boston 4.8% 5 . Chicago 18.8% 9. San Francisco 9.8% 
CT (07) IL (14) AZ (03) 
ME (20) IN (15) CA (05/55)2 
MA (22) MI (23) HI (12) 
NH (30) MN (24) NV (29). 
RI (41) OH (36) AS (64)3 
VT (47) WI (52) GU (65)3 
MX (59)3 
New York 5.9% 6. Dallas 14.8% 11. Seattle 4.2% 
NJ (31) AR (04) AK (02) 
NY (33) LA (19) ID (13) 
PR (40) 3 NM (32) OR (38) 
VI (48)3 OK (37) WA (50) 
CN (56)3 TX (45) 
P hila. 8.7% 7. Kansas City 9.0% 
DE (08) IA (16) 
DC (09) KS (17) 
MD (21) M0 (26) 
PA (39) 
VA (49) 
WV (51) 
NE (28) 
Atlanta 18.7% 8. Denver 5.4% 
AL (01) CO (06) 
FL (10) MT (27) 
GA (11) ND (35) 
KY (18) SD (43) 
MS (25) UT (46) 
NC (34) 
SC (42) 
TN (44) 
WY (53) 
State code in parentheses 
Code 55 is used for California SNFs 
Foreign or U.S. Territories excluded from the analysis. 
PR = Puerto Rico AS = American Samoa 
VI = Virgin Islands GU = Guam 
CN = Canada MX = Mexico 
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Table 2 
Type of Cont ro1 
Sample 
Proportions 
1. Voluntary NP , Church 13 .2% 
2 . Voluntary NP , Other 42 .0 
3 . P rop riet a ry , Individual 0.2 
4 . Proprietary, Corporation 12 .2 
5 . Proprietary, Partnership 2 .9 
6 . Gove rnmenta 1 , Federal 0.4 
7 . Gove rnment a 1 , City-County 0.1 
8. Governmenta1 , County 2 .7 
9 . Gove rnment a 1 , State 11.7 
10 . Governmenta1 , Hospital District 4 .0 
11 . Gove rnment a 1 , City 7 .0 
12 . Gove rnmenta 1 , Other 3.5 
100.0% 
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Table 3 
Type of Hospital 
Sample 
P ropo r11ons 
1. General Short Term (average LOS < 25 
days[19]) 90.3% 
2 . General Long Term 0.6 
3 . Tube rculosis 0 .0 
4 . Specialty Short Term 1 .5 
5 . Specialty Long Term 0 .8 
6. Chronic Disease 0.5 
7 . Psychiatric 5 .0 
8 . Other 1 .3 
100.0% 
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Table 4 
Cost Report Status 
S ample 
P ropo rtIons 
1. Reopened 0.1% 
2 . Settled with audit 28.6 
3 . Audited, not settled 0 .7 
4 . Settled, without audit 3 .4 
5 . As submitted 67 .0 
100.0% 
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Table 5 
System Type 
Sample 
P roportions 
1. Catholic Church 8.4% 
2 . Other Church 2 .0 
3 . Other NP 7 .5 
4 . Investor Owned 12 .3 
5 . Independent 69 .8 
100.0% 
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Table 6 
System Affiliation 
Sample 
Proportions 
1. Owned 88.5% 
2 . Leased 2 .1 
3 . Sponsored 1 .8 
4 . Contract Managed 7 .6 
100.0% 
Table 7 
Services 
Adults and pediatrics (general routine care) 
ICU 
CCU 
All other special care units 
Subprovider I 
Subprovider II 
Nu rs e ry 
Skilled nursing care facility (SNF) 
Intermediate care facility (ICF) 
Other long-term care facility 
Operating room 
Recovery room 
Delivery room and labor room 
Anes thesiology 
Radiology - diagnostic 
Radiology - therapeutic 
Radioisotope 
Laboratory 
Whole blood and packed red blood cells 
Blood storing, processing and transfusion 
Intravenous therapy 
Respiratory therapy 
Physical therapy 
Occupational therapy 
Speech pathology 
Electrocardiology 
Electroencephalography 
Medical supplies charged to patients 
Drugs charged to patients 
Renal dialysis 
All other inpatient ancillary cost centers 
Outpatient clinic 
Emergency 
All other outpatient service cost centers 
All other reimbursable cost centers 
Total hospital reimbursable costs after stepdown 
All nonreimbursable cost centers 
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Table 8 
Distribution of Cases within FYE 
FYE Number of Cases % 
1/84 1 0.0 
5/84 1 0.0 
6/84 2 0 .0 
8/84 4 0.1 
9/84 1,160 21 .2 
10/84 64 1 .2 
11/84 52 1 .0 
12/84 1,606 29 .4 
1/85 30 0 .5 
2/85 40 0.7 
3/85 198 3 .6 
4/85 122 2 .2 
5/85 139 2 .5 
6/85 1,784 32 .6 
7/85 48 0 .9 
8/85 207 3.8 
9/85 12 0.2 
12/85 1 0.0 
5,47 1 100.0% 
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Table 9 
Significance Level of Correlation of FYE with Entire 
Sample, by Medicare Region, Type of Control and System Code 
FYE 1/84 5/84 
Kenda11 
Correlations: 
Regions .889 .675 
Control .300 .730 
System .550 .212 
(exc1. indep . ) 
System .548 .216 
(incl. ind ep . ) 
11/84 12/84 
Regions .178 .061 
Control .009 .001 
System .122 .001 
(exc1. ind ep . ) 
System .036 .001 
(incl. ind ep .) 
5/85 6/85 
Regions .020 .026 
Control .018 .001 
System .001 .001 
(exc1. ind ep . ) 
System .001 .001 
(incl. ind ep .) 
6/84 8/84 9/84 10/84 
.484 .070 .061 .020 
.127 .106 .002 .031 
— .516 .001 .058 
.201 .119 .001 .018 
1/85 2/85 3/85 4/85 
.122 .009 .003 .013 
.156 .006 .001 .011 
.024 .062 .001 .063 
.006 .019 .001 .021 
7/85 8/85 9/85 12/85 
.016 .004 .132 .889 
.016 .003 .011 .205 
.001 .002 .0936 — 
.001 .001 .410 .201 
Continued Next Page 
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FYE 1/84 
Spearman 
Correlations: 
5/84 6/84 8/84 9/84 10/84 
Regions .874 .631 .467 .047 .108 .008 
Control .207 .685 .085 .075 .001 .023 
System 
(exc1. 
.415 
indep . ) 
.088 — ~ .374 .001 .045 
System 
(inc1 . 
.412 
indep.) 
.091 .080 .062 .001 .013 
Number 1 1 2 4 1,160 64 
% 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0.1 21 .2 1 .2 
11/84 12/84 1/85 2/85 3/85 4/85 
Regions .178 .054 .081 .005 .001 .007 
Control .027 .001 .133 .002 .001 .013 
System 
(exc1. 
.094 
indep.) 
.001 .013 .048 .001 .053 
System 
(inc1 . 
.025 
indep.) 
.001 .003 .014 .001 .017 
Number 52 1,606 30 40 198 122 
% 1 .0 29 .4 0 .5 0 .7 3 .6 2 .2 
5/85 6/85 7/85 8/85 9/85 12/85 
Regions .006 .019 .007 .002 .154 .874 
Control .011 .001 .009 .003 .007 .114 
System 
(exc1 . 
.001 
indep.) 
.001 .001 .001 .923 
System 
(incl . 
.001 
indep.) 
.001 .001 .001 .350 .080 
Sum 
139 1,784 48 
2 .5 32 .6 0.9 
207 12 1 
3 .8 0.2 0.0 
Number 
% 
5 ,471 
100.0% 
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Table 12 
Low Loading Variables 
1. X16 County Code 
2 . X1 8 Paid Minus Nonpaid Workers per Census 
3 . X23 Adjusted Profit Margin 
4 . X24 Ma rkup 
5 . X29 Payor Mix 
6. X32 Physicians’ Hours per Case 
7 . X33 Asset Turnover 
8. X37 Cost Report Status 
9 . X39 Debt Ratio 
10 . X43 % Donations 
11 . X44 Plant Asset Remaining Life 
12 . X46 Cost Reporting Period Ending Date (FYE) 
13 . X47 % Investment Income 
14 . X53 % Subprovider II Costs 
15 . X59 % Recovery Room Costs 
16 . X61 % Anesthesiology Costs 
17 . X63 % Radiology-Therapeutic Costs 
18 . X66 % Funded Depreciation 
19 . X 6 8 % Blood Storing, Processing, and Transfusion 
Costs 
20 . X73 Accreditation 
21 . X77 % Electroencephalography Costs 
22 . X 81 % all Other Inpatient Ancillary Cost Centers 
Costs 
23 . X84 % All Other Outpatient Service Cost Centers 
Costs 
24 . X87 Management/Support Services Purchased 
25 . X90 Interns and Residents Costs per Physician Hour 
26 . X98 % All Other Special Care Unit Bed Days 
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Table 14 
Canonical Discriminant Functions 
Panel A, Complete Factor Analytic Model 
% of Cumula tive Canonical - 
Function Eigenvalue Va riance Percent Co rrelation - 
1* .48241 36 .71 36 .71 .5704586 - 
2* .35533 27 .04 63 .75 .5120285 - 
3* .30501 23 .21 86 .96 .4834483 - 
4* .11057 8.41 95.37 .3155394 - 
5* .03823 2.91 98.28 .1918849 - 
6* .01141 .87 99 .15 .1062006 - 
7 .00750 .57 99 .72 .0862852 - 
8 .00371 .28 100.00 .0607624 - 
After Wi Iks 
Function Lambda Chi-Squared D .F . S ignificance 
0 .3234105 6007.1 240 0.0 
1 .4794271 3912 .2 203 0 .0 
2 .6497827 2294 .2 168 0.0 
3 .8479728 877 .55 135 0 .0 
4 .9417369 319 .45 104 .0000 
5 .9777370 119 .81 75 .0005 
6 .9888903 59 .451 48 .1243 
7 .9963079 19.684 23 .6609 
* marks the six functions to be used in the remaining 
analy sis. 
Continued Next Page 
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Panel B, Complete Highest Loading Raw Data Variables Model 
% of Cumulative Canonical - 
Function Eigenvalue Variance Percent Correlation - 
1* .62439 43.86 43 .86 .6199880 - 
2* .37819 26 .57 70.43 .5238420 - 
3* .23505 16.51 86 .94 .4362505 - 
4* .12773 8 .97 95 .91 .3365479 - 
5* .03340 2 .35 98 .25 .1797916 - 
6* .01265 .89 99 .14 .1117686 - 
7* .00815 .57 99 .72 .0899358 - 
8 .00404 .28 100.00 .0634563 
After 
Function 
Wilks 
Lamb d a Chi-Squared D .F . Significance 
0 .3027620 6358 .8 232 0.0 
1 .4918042 3776 .9 196 0 .0 
2 .6777994 2069 .7 162 0.0 
3 .8371144 946 .22 130 0 .0 
4 .9440406 306 .47 100 .0000 
5 .9755761 131 .60 72 .0000 
6 .9879 174 64 .695 46 .0358 
7 .9959733 21 .473 22 .49 17 
* marks the seven functions to be used in the remaining 
analy sis. 
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Table 15 
Factors in Order of Relative Discriminatory Power 
(Factor numbers in parentheses) 
1. System Affiliation (18) 
2 . Size (6) 
3. Local Market Share (16) 
4. System Attributes (3) 
5. Type of Hospital (14) 
6. Location (8) 
7. Speech Pathology (24) 
8. ICU (23) 
9. CCU (30) 
10. Patient Volume (21) 
11. Other Long Term Care (28) 
12. Reimbursabi1ity, Other Special Care (17, 22) 
13. Profitability per Case, All Inclusive Rate (4, 25) 
14. Ancillaries, SNF (2, 15) 
15. Service Mix, Turnover (1, 7) 
16. Debt Per Case, Cost per Day (9, 12) 
17. LOS, Capital Intensity, ROE (10, 13, 27) 
18. Case Mix, ROA (19, 20) 
19. Occupancy (5) 
20. Maternity, Liquidity (11, 29) 
21. Intermediate Care (26) 
128 
Table 16 
Highest Loading Raw Data Variables in Order of 
Relative Discriminatory Power 
(Associated factors in parentheses) 
1. X19 System Type (18) 
2 . X95 % of County Admissions (16) 
3 . X13 Adjusted Admissions (6, 21) 
4 . X99 % ICU Bed Days (23) 
5 . X3 Medicare Region (8) 
6. X56 % Intermediate Care Facility Costs (26) 
7 . X54 % Nursery Costs (11) 
8 . XI 5 Case Flow (19) 
9 . X93 All Inclusive Rate Provider (25) 
10 . Xll CMI Adjusted LOS (10) 
X57 % Other Long Term Care Facility Costs (28) 
11 . X 86 % Total Hospital Reimbursable Costs After 
Stepdown Costs (17) 
12 . X75 % Speech Pathology Costs (24) 
13 . X22 Adjusted Profit per Case (4) 
X10 Occupancy Rate (5) 
14 . X34 Plant Asset Turnover (7) 
X42 Debt per Case (9) 
X36 Assets per Case (13) 
15 . X38 Current Ratio (29) 
16 . X28 Cost per Day (12) 
17 . X97 % CCU Bed Days (30) 
18 . X92 % Hospital Malpractice Insurance Premiums (2) 
19 . X48 % Adults and Pediatrics (General Routine Care) 
Costs (1) 
20 . XI Number of Facilities in System (3) 
21 . X51 % All Other Special Care Units Costs (22) 
22 . X2 1 Adjusted Return on Equity (27) 
23 . X55 % Skilled Nursing Facillity Costs (15) 
24 . X20 Adjusted Return on Assets (20) 
25 . X94 Type of Hospital (14) 
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Appendix B 
Major Systems in Sample 
AHA 
System 
Code 
No. of Facilities 
Rep re s ent ed 
in Sample System Name^ 
1755 289 Hospital Corporation of America 
(10,351) 
0125 77 American Medical International 
(10,93) 
1235 68 Humana, Inc. (10,81) 
3015 44 National Medical Enterprises 
(10,64) 
2235 39 Lutheran Hospital and Homes 
Society of America (NP,43) 
0695 28 Charter Medical Corporation 
(10,35) 
0025 27 Sunhealth, Inc. (NP,29) 
1535 26 Great Plains Health Alliance, 
Inc. (NP , 2 7) 
2105 26 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 
(NP,27) 
0585 24 Brim and Associates, Inc. 
(10,28) 
6525 24 Republic Health Corporation 
(10,31) 
5175 22 Catholic Health Corporation 
(CC ,2 4) 
5165 21 Sisters of Mercy Health 
Corporation (CC,23) 
1375 18 American Healthcare Management, 
Inc. (10,24) 
1815 18 Intermounta in Health Care, Inc. 
(NP ,21) 
161 
9555 16 Universal Health Services, Inc. 
(10,20) 
4165 13 Adventist Health System—Sunbe1t 
Health Care Corporation (CO,22) 
9355 13 Adventist Health System—Eastern 
and Middle America (CO,21) 
1 System Type and number of facilities in parentheses. 
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